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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMEBACK OF MERGERS AND

ACQUISITIONS
In recent years, a new wave of merger and acquisition
activity has greeted the corporate world.' Unlike the hostile
takeover wave of the 1980's, the current wave of takeovers
is characterized by mergers and acquisitions initiated by
large, publicly held companies such as IBM or Disney, as
opposed to private LBO firms or corporate raiders like T.
Boone Pickens or Carl Icahn. These "new" mergers often
are completed under "friendly" circumstances and are
justified by various potential synergies between bidder and
target, such as economies of scale and scope and vertical
integration. "Unlike the ill-fated conglomerate mergers of
the 1960's or the hostile buy-outs of the 1980's, the new
wave of mergers and acquisitions promises to improve
industrial production and generate substantial increases in
shareholder wealth. Indeed, The Economist has recently
observed: "Entailing true romance rather than shotgun
weddings, tempting synergies rather than financial

' According to several recent business articles the current merger
wave may well dwarf that of the 1980s in volume and value of the deals.
See Michael J. Mande! et al., Land of the Giants, Bus. WK., Sept. 11,
1995, at 34.
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opportunism, no rash of mergers has seemed more benign,
or better calculated to boost corporate profits."2
It is probably too soon to tell whether the current wave
of merger activity is any different from former waves that
have swept Wall Street. Whatever the case, target
shareholders that confront such merger activity will not be
lacking in legal protection from bidders offering too little
stock or cash for the value of their stock. If target
shareholders dislike an offer, they can use their voting
power to block a bid.' In addition, legal mechanisms such as
the Williams Act4 prevent bidders from taking targets by
surprise, reduce the coercive effect of tender offers, and
arguably result in higher premium payments to target
shareholders.5 Legal mechanisms not only protect target
shareholders from overreaching bidders, but they also
protect them from overreaching managers as well. In
Delaware, judges examine target managers' defensive
actions according to a heightened standard of review as
dictated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.6 Moreover, once the target is put up for
sale, its managers must procure the highest premium
possible for target shareholders - usually through an
auction.7 Finally, if the shareholder truly believes that a
bidder's price fails to reflect the value of his stock, he can
'The Trouble with Mergers, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1994, at 1. The
editorial proceeds to argue that the newest wave of mergers in fact may
not turn out to be as beneficial as expected.
3 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991). Discussed infra, Part
III.A.
" A tender offer is an offer made by a bidder directly to the target's
shareholders for their stock. For discussion of the Williams Act, see infra,
Part III.C.
5 In addition, state anti-takeover mechanisms and various defenses
designed by lawyers, such as the "poison pill" arguably protect target
shareholders from overreaching bidders by strengthening management's
negotiating position when and if an offer is made to buy the company.
See generally Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom;
An UpdateAfter One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981).
6493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Discussed infra, Part III.B.
'See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
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ask for appraisal rights and opt out of the transaction
altogether.'
Unlike target shareholders, the owners of acquiring
firms do not enjoy legal protection for the value of their
stock when their managers decide to acquire other firms.
Indeed, as bidding firms increase their premium in order to
win more competitive auctions, their shareholders are more
likely to suffer a loss in the value of their stock rather than
a gain. Despite the magnitude of loss they may suffer from
overpriced and ill-fated acquisitions, bidder shareholders
have no more legal protection from their ego-driven
managers than the deferential standards of judicial review
laid out by the business judgment rule.' In fact, the only
way a shareholder can signal his displeasure with his
company's impending acquisition is to take the "Wall Street
walk": upon announcement of a pending acquisition, he can
sell his stock.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether
bidder shareholders ought to have more options than the
"Wall Street walk" when their managers propose
acquisitions that threaten to destroy the value of their
stock.0 Ten years ago, one commentator observed that
[t]he reams of commentary on corporate mergers,
acquisitions and tender offers have focused largely on
protection of shareholders of acquired (or target)
companies from both the depredations of acquiring
(or raider) companies and the cupidity of their own
managements in either negotiating the terms or
obstructing the accomplishment of transactions.
Virtually no attention has been paid to the plight of
tit. 8, § 262 (1991). Appraisal rights entitle the
dissenting shareholder to sue for the fair value of his stock in court. A
8See

DEL. CODE ANN.

shareholder may not sue for appraisal rights if the merger in question

entails an exchange of stock that is traded on a national stock market
exchange. See discussion infra, Part III.D.
The business judgment rule is a presumption employed by courts

that the decisions of corporate management are unreviewable unless a
breach of fiduciary duty is present. See Part III.B supra.
'0My analysis is limited to shareholders of publicly held firms.
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shareholders of acquiring companies devastated by
unwise acquisitions."

Today, the legal status of bidder shareholders is of greater
importance, as more of the acquirers participating in the
current era of takeovers are publicly held companies. When
a takeover initiated by a publicly held corporation fails to
deliver its promised riches, large numbers of shareholders
suffer uncompensated losses on the value of their stock. In
today's new wave of merger activity, the time has come to
reassess the way in which the law treats bidder
shareholders.
Increased legal protection of bidder shareholders can be
justified on two broad grounds: first, the law should protect
the bidder shareholder from losses wrongfully caused by the
bidder's officers and directors, who owe a fiduciary duty of
loyalty and care to the shareholders of the corporation,
regardless of whether the corporation is a target or a
bidder. 2 Second, the law should attempt to promote an
efficient allocation of resources. Acquisitions are often
criticized as wealth-reducing vehicles or mere wealth
transfers between one group to another. If that is the case,
legal mechanisms designed to deter this type of activity
should be put in place to better ensure a more efficient
allocation of resources. In the past, those legal mechanisms
have taken the form of target defenses, such as the
Williams Act or Unocal review. It is now time to reconsider
whether or not those mechanisms should now take the form
of bidder shareholder defenses, especially if the bidder
shareholders are the parties with the most to lose. 3
" George W. Dent, Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market-Based
Legal Response, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 777 (1986) (emphasis added).
2 See Dent, supra note 11, at 779-80 (disputing argument that
management owes duties to investing public as a whole and not
individual investors, who presumably could diversify the risk of a poor
acquisition by investing in different stocks).
3 See John C. Coffee Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1173-74 (1984).
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In this paper, I construct the argument for increased
legal protection of bidder shareholders by first looking at
the comparatively large number of options open to the
target shareholder, either when he is dissatisfied with an
offer to buy the company, or when he is unhappy with his
management's response to what appears to be a fair bid.
Part III briefly surveys target shareholder protections, such
as state mandated voting rights, judicial review of target
defenses, federal regulation of the takeover process, and
appraisal rights. The target shareholder clearly has several
options when he feels that the value of his stock is
threatened by a takeover or by management's defense
against a takeover. In contrast, bidder shareholders enjoy
few legal protections from losses of stock market value
caused by acquisitions. So long as the bidder management
engages in a reasonably deliberative process prior to
engaging in the acquisition, courts will find that it has
fulfilled Delaware's duty of care as defined by Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 4 and they will accord management's decision
deference under the business judgment rule.
Part IV discusses the common justifications for
acquisitions, and considers whether or not the law's
asymmetrical treatment of bidder and target shareholders
is a reasonable policy. Various competing hypotheses
attempt to explain the large premiums above market price
that acquirers pay for targets. These theories fall into three
general categories. The first group is based on the
assumption that the stock market is not completely
efficient. The theories in this category explain bidder
premiums as the result of (a) "inside information," whereby
the bidder possesses information allowing it to offer more
than market price for control of the company; (b) "market
discount theory," which assumes that the market is
informationally efficient, but less efficient as a reflection of
the true value of the corporation; and (c) the downward
sloping demand hypothesis, which argues that the market

14 488

A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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for corporate control and the market for stock are
completely separate markets.
The second category of theories explains and justifies
bidder premiums as the result of transactions that will
ultimately create wealth. The theories most often invoked
under this heading are (a) "synergy," including economies of

scope and scale, as well as vertical integration; and (b)
"managerial discipline" whereby the target's .stock price is
lower than the bidder's offer because incumbent managers
have wasted the corporation's assets.
Finally, a third group of theories explains bidder
premiums as partial or full wealth transfers from bidder
shareholders to target shareholders. Included within this
group are (a) empire building, in which the bidding
manager's rationale for offering the premium is largely
fueled by his desire to expand the company, add to his
prestige and perhaps raise his compensation; (b) hubris, in
which the manager overestimates his ability to extract
profits from the target; (c) winner's curse, in which the
bidder pays too much for the target because of the nature of
auction in which he purchased it; and finally, (d) the
"agency/cash-flow" hypothesis, which attempts to explain
the large premiums bidders pay to target shareholders as
one of the agency costs of free cash flow. Michael Jensen
initially set forth this theory in defense of takeovers and the
market for corporate control, arguing that debt-producing
leveraged buyouts would force managers to pay out excess
cash flows to debt-holders and thus reduce management's
proclivity to invest extra cash in negative net present value
acquisitions.15 Other commentators, however, have shown
that under Jensen's theory, takeovers are not only a
15

Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and

Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE
HOSTILE TAKEOVER, (John C. Coffee Jr. et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Jensen, Takeover Controversy and KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS];

Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. EcON. REV., May 1986, at 323. [hereinafter
Jensen, Agency Costs].
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"solution" to the cash flow problem but a symptom of the
cash flow problem as well. 6
Which account is correct? One way to answer this
question (as well as the larger issue of whether bidder
shareholders warrant legal protection at all) is to look at
literature surveying bidder shareholder returns following
acquisitions. The evidence within most articles seems to
suggest that bidder shareholders almost never gain and
often lose. If this is the case, then the hubris, empire
building, winner's curse, and the agency/free cash flow
hypotheses may well be correct - at least in some
circumstances.
But so what? Certainly, the mere fact that one's
managers are misinvesting funds does not, without more,
warrant enhanced legal protection. Part V therefore
explains why enhanced legal protection is necessary and
further explores those legal mechanisms most likely to aid
bidder shareholders without unduly complicating or
destroying the takeover process. In addition, I argue that
increased protection of bidder shareholders can be
accomplished without undermining or repealing current
protections of target shareholders already in place, such as
the Williams Act.
II. PROLOGUE: THE NEWEST WAVE OF M&A ACTIVITY
Before discussing the legal status of bidder shareholders
in the merger and acquisition context, a few words need to
be said about the newest wave of takeover and merger
activity. Following the passage of state anti-takeover
legislation, 7 and the onset of a credit crunch and federal
indictment of junk bond financier Michael Milken, the
" See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597
(1989); Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good
Targets?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990).
17 Anti-takeover legislation had been passed in 41 states as of mid1995. See Mergers & Acquisitions Report, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST,

September 19, 1995. (Supplied by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center).
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hostile takeover market virtually collapsed in 1989.8
Mergers and acquisition activity massively decreased in the
early 1990s, prompting one scholar to quip, "The takeover
wars are over. Management won."'9
Since that time, mergers and acquisitions have returned
with a vengeance. In 1995, merger and acquisition activity
set new record levels in both price and number of deals." In
1996, merger volume increased, while takeover premiums
decreased somewhat.2 Whether the decrease in premiums
represents an aberration or permanent trend is a question
that cannot be answered definitively at this time. In any
event, the mergers of today, however, differ significantly
from their earlier counterparts. First, they are (currently)
friendly.'
8 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for

Dealing With BarbariansInside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861-62
(1993).
19Id.
20According to Securities Data Inc., 9,150 domestic deals valued at
$519 billion were announced in 1995. Edward Adams, M&A Volume in
'96Hits Record High, N.Y. L. J., Jan. 2, 1997, at 5.
21 In
1996, 10,210 domestic deals were announced valued at $653
billion dollars. Id. Despite the continuing interest in mergers and
acquisitions, premiums may be deflating on average. The Wall Street
Journal has reported that data compiled by J.P. Morgan demonstrates
that the premiums paid by acquirers to target corporations has shrunk
by more than 50% since 1990. Steven Lipin, Takeover Premiums Lose
Some Luster, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1996, at 13; see also Lipin, Merger
Wave Gathers Force As Strategies Demand Buying or Being Bought,
WALL ST. J., February 26, 1997, at Al (noting that premiums have eased
from 57% to 28% of the target's pre-merger stock price in 1996). Since
premiums were initially high to begin with (the median in 1990 was 56%
according to J.P. Morgan's data), this information does not necessarily
mean that takeover premiums are "just right." Moreover, J.P. Morgan's
figures present the average premiums paid by acquirers, suggesting that
some acquirers continue to present target shareholders with offers above
and beyond the stock market's valuation of their stock.
According to Salomon Brothers, unsolicited bids represented less
than 5% of the total volume of announced deals in 1995. Mergers and
Acquisitions Report, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 15, 1996, at 14.
These bids, however, often started out hostile and became friendly only
later in time (e.g. IBM's acquisition of Lotus). Moreover, some
commentators have suggested that a trend towards hostile acquisitions
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Second, they are considerably more expensive.' Third, they
are executed by widely held public corporations seeking to
increase overall size and thus compete globally, or to spur
growth in a particular area.' Unlike corporate raiders of
times past, the current group of corporate acquirers do not
wish to break their newly targets into component parts and
sell them off. Rather, they seek growth amidst a
competitive global economy. Fourth, the new wave of
mergers and acquisitions is funded mostly by stock, and not
by cash or debt.' Finally, the newest wave of merger and
acquisition activity raises questions of monopoly power and
the efficacy of the federal government's enforcement of the
antitrust laws, since many of the mergers currently taking
place are between companies in the same or similar
industries.

III.

TARGET SHAREHOLDER PROTECTIONS

Target shareholders enjoy several varieties of legal
protections from losses due to mergers or acquisitions."6
may be forming. See Steven Lipin, 1995 Year-End Review of Markets and
Finance,WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at R8.
' The Wall Street Journal has dubbed 1995 the year of "megadeals."
Lipin, supra note 21. Mergerstat reported that megadeals accounted for
60 percent of the mergers and acquisitions market. "There were 75
transactions of $1 billion or more in 1995 - an increase of 60 percent
from 47 such deals in 1994." Ronald E. Yates, Outdoing the '80s Frenzy:
Big Deals,and More of Them, CHI.TRIB., Jan. 28, 1996, available in 1996
WL 2638072.
2' When IBM bid for Lotus in June 1995, Business Week reported
that the acquirer's top executives had concluded that the fastest way to
increase IBM's network software presence was to buy Lotus. See Amy
Cortese & Ira Sager, Gerstner at the Gates, Bus. WK., June 19, 1995, at
36.
""In 1995, it was stock - not cash - that was king. Nearly 60% of
all companies used stock as acquisition currency, up from earlier years,
aided by a booming stock market that effectively made purchases
cheaper." Lipin, supra note 21.
29 "Fair value" is itself a loaded phrase. For
those who accept the
"strong form" efficient capital market hypothesis theory, any bid priced
above the current stock market price is a premium for the target
shareholder and is therefore a prioria fair price. For the purposes of this
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Although some of these legal mechanisms have been
criticized as providing target management with too much
power to entrench itself, these mechanisms nevertheless
protect the target shareholder from self-interested
managers and overreaching bidders. The following is a brief
summary of four of the most noteworthy legal mechanisms
that protect target shareholders: voting rights, judicial
review, federal takeover regulation, and the appraisal
remedy.

A. Voting Rights
Under Delaware' law, a majority of target shareholders
entitled to vote must ratify a merger agreement at an
annual or special meeting before the deal is completed. 2
section, however, I will assume that the strong form efficient market
hypothesis does not exist, and further, that stock prices are regularly
discounted by the market to take into account the incompetence or
inefficiency of the target's incumbent management. See Reinier
Kraakman, Taking DiscountsSeriously: The Implicationsof "Discounted"
Share PricesAs An Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988).
Both of these concepts (the efficient capital market hypothesis and the
discount theory) will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV below.
27 Since Delaware remains the predominant locus
of incorporation for
most businesses, much of Part III focuses on the decisions of the
Delaware courts and its statutory provisions. I do note, however, those
aspects of takeover law in which Delaware's law diverges significantly
from that of other jurisdictions.
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991) states:
The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section
shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent
corporation at an annual or special meeting for the purpose
of acting on the agreement. Due notice of the time, place
and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of
stock .... The notice shall contain a copy of the agreement
or a brief summary thereof, as the directors shall deem
advisable. At the meeting, the agreement shall be
considered and a vote taken for its adoption or rejection. If a
majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled
to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the
agreement, that fact shall be certified on the agreement by
the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation.
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Like other states, Delaware, in turn, provides the
corporation's board of directors with the power to allocate
voting power to various classes of stock within the
corporation's charter.29 Most public corporations adhere to a
single class voting scheme, whereby common stock receives
all the voting power, and preferred stock receives voting
power contingent only on the corporation's failure to pay a
dividend over a certain period of time." Despite federal
attempts to create one, no legal rule binds the corporation
to a "one vote/one share" system among common stock.31
Nevertheless, the New York Stock Exchange's refusal to list
any corporation providing non-voting common stock
encourages most public companies to adhere to the oneshare/one-vote rule.32

Shareholders also retain the right to vote for the corporation's sale of

assets (known sometimes as a "de facto" merger). See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1991).
2

Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1991), the corporation's

board of directors may issue nonvoting stock.

"Most public corporations concentrate voting rights in a single,
publicly traded class of common shares." Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R.
Palmiter, JudicialSchizophrenia in ShareholderVoting Cases, 79 IOWA
L. REV. 485, 498 (1994). Corporations may, nonetheless, create a class of
stock called "blank check preferred", whereby the board of directors
reserves the right to allocate voting power to the class of stock at its
discretion. Blank check preferred stock makes the target less attractive
to a would-be acquirer because it increases the acquirer's difficulty in
gaining control of the board of directors. See Melissa M. Kurp, Corporate
Takeover Defenses After QVC: Can Target Boards Prevent Hostile Tender
Offers Without Breaching Their FiduciaryDuties?, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
29, 50 (1994).
31 In 1989, the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4, which
mandated single
class offerings of stock to owners of common stock. This Rule did not
survive judicial scrutiny. See Business Roundtable v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 565 (1991).
32 NYSE has refused to list the stock of corporations
that have issued
non-voting common stock to the public. Facing competition from
NASDAQ, the NYSE has considered dropping the "one-share/one-vote"
rule for common stock. See discussion in Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note
30, at 498-99 n.63 (1994).

Nos. 2 & 3:319]

BIDDER AND TARGET SHAREHOLDERS

Shareholder voting protects target shareholders in two
ways. First, if shareholders wish to block a bid because they
think it is too low, they can vote against it. Second, if they
wish to accept a bid - by redeeming a poison pill or
accepting an acquisition pursuant to the procedures
outlined by the state anti-takeover statutes - they can vote
out the current board of directors and put in place new
management to negotiate with the bidding corporation.
Despite the theoretical uses of a shareholder vote, its use
as a tool of corporate democracy is undermined by the
perception that widely dispersed shareholders lack the
incentive or ability to cast an informed vote. According to
the traditional Berle and Means concept of separation of
ownership and control within the corporation, a collective
action problem develops in widely held public corporations
because the single shareholder's costs of acquiring
information outweigh any potential gain as a consequence
of his vote.33 Thus, when a merger is proposed, the target
shareholder will most likely sit back and wait for someone
else to acquire the necessary information.' Despite the
persuasiveness of this argument, empirical evidence
suggests that it is less true than when Berle and Means
wrote about the structure of the corporation in 1932.
Institutional investors now own a significant percentage of
stock; due to the size of their stake in public corporations,
they have more incentive to gather information about stock
than they do to sell it. 35 As one academic argues,

"[i]ncreased
concentration of shareholding makes
shareholder activism more rational, making it easier for
shareholders to surmount the classic collective action
problem that forms the basis for much of corporate law,
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
3' This

is commonly called the "free rider" problem. See Grundfest,
supra note 18, at 908. Grundfest classifies the collective action problem
further into three categories: free rider problems, communication among
and coordination of shareholders, and rational apathy.
See generally, Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivityReexamined,
89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 566-75 (1989).
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namely, the problem facing dispersed shareholders in
disciplining management." 6 The phenomenon of relational
investing 7 therefore increases the importance of the
shareholder franchise. 38
Unlike target shareholders, bidder shareholders are not
uniformly assured voting rights when acquisitions are
announced and completed. Instead, their right to register
their dissent and prevent a wasteful transaction depends on
the state in which their firm is incorporated. Under
Delaware law, a bidder shareholder may cast a vote in favor
of or against a merger only if the proposed transaction
would result in the issuance of a certain number of new
shares in excess of 20% of the ones already outstanding. 9
" Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
InstitutionalShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (1991).
37Relational investors see themselves as long term owners
of the
firm, as opposed to short term investors. According to Professor Gordon,
"[r]elational investing depends on the interrelation of three elements:
substantial share ownership, a commitment to an extended holding
period, and a reciprocal engagement with management over the business
policy decisions of the firm." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutionsas Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 124, 129
(1994).

For an interesting account of how relational investors can use
voting power symbolically to loosen the incumbent management's grip on
the top positions within the corporation, see Grundfest, supra note 18.
3' See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §251(f(1991): "Notwithstanding the
requirements of subsection (c) [providing for target shareholder voting
rights] of this section, unless required by its certificate of incorporation,
no vote of stockholders of a constituent corporation surviving a merger
shall be necessary to authorize a merger if . . . (3) securities or
obligations convertible into such stock are to be issued or delivered under
the plan of merger. . . do not exceed 20% of the shares of common stock of
such constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the
effective date of the merger." (emphasis added).
Of course, a corporation's charter can provide more extensive voting
rights for its shareholders than the standard form rules provided by the
state's corporation law. For example, in American General Corp. v.
Unitrin, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. 1994), the corporation's charter
provided that all mergers required the approval of seventy 75% of the
shareholders. This supermajority requirement allowed a minority insider
group of board members to take control of 28% of the company and
thereby prevent any merger or acquisition that the Board did not like.
38
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Unlike Delaware, Ohio offers bidder shareholders greater
protection by giving them the right to vote on any
transaction that would result in an issuance of stock
equaling one-sixth the number of outstanding shares."
Once the Ohio provision is triggered, a supermajority4' two-thirds of the shareholders - must approve the
transaction in question. Finally, New York treats all
shareholders equally: with the exception of short form
mergers, all shareholders of constituent corporations must
ratify a proposed merger or acquisition by a two-thirds
vote.42 Even in states that provide bidder shareholders
Thus, under this scheme, bidder or target shareholders would be
forbidden from completing a transaction without the approval of an
entrenched minority. Unitrin's shareholders effectively had no voting
rights
4 at all.
1 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1701.78(D)
(Banks-Baldwin 1994):
In the case of a merger, the agreement shall also be adopted
by the shareholders of the surviving corporation at a
meeting held for the purpose, if one or more of the following
conditions exist:
(1) [the article of incorporation require such a vote]
(2) The agreement conflicts with the articles or
regulations of the surviving corporation then in
effect, or changes the articles or regulations...
(3) The merger involves the issuance or transfer by
the surviving corporation to the shareholders of the
other constituent corporation or corporations of
such number of shares of the surviving corporation
as will entitle the holders of the shares
immediately after the consummation of the merger
to exercise one-sixth or more of the voting power of
that corporation in the election of directors.
41

OHIo REV. CODE A'NN. § 1701.78 (F)(Banks-Baldwin 1994). The

shareholders can opt out of the two-thirds provision for any other
provision that does not fall below majority vote by designation in the
corporate charter.
See, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1986):
(a) The board of each constituent corporation, upon adopting
such plan of merger or consolidation, shall submit such plan
to a vote of shareholders in accordance with the following:
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with voting rights prior to completion of an acquisition,
bidder managers still can avoid the voting requirement by
structuring the acquisition as a purchase of the target's
stock or assets.4" Thus, bidder shareholders simply receive
less voting rights protection than target shareholders when
mergers and acquisitions are under consideration.
B. Judicial Review
Perhaps the most important source of legal protection
for the target shareholder is the ability to secure judicial
review of target management's actions in response to a bid.
"Judicial review" includes judicial intervention in the
takeover process before the takeover has been completed (as
in injunctive relief), and intervention to compel
management's payment of damages to shareholders after
the transaction has been completed (as in punitive or
compensatory damages). In carrying out any business
transaction, the officers and directors are expected to fulfill
their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation's
shareholders.' Ordinarily, judges presume that directors
and officers have fulfilled these duties and refuse to secondguess the business expertise of the managers of a firm. This
presumption is known as the business judgment rule, and it

(2) The
adopted
holders
entitled

plan of merger or consolidation shall be
at a meeting of shareholders by vote of the
of two-thirds of all outstanding shares
to vote thereon....

See Dent, supra note 11, at 786 n.51, citing W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 145-46 (1980) for the
proposition that no approval of acquiring shareholders is necessary when
a transaction is not a statutory merger. Dent notes, however, that this
harsh rule is muted somewhat by the NYSE's regulations that require
shareholder approval of any acquisition, "however structured, that will
increase the acquirer's outstanding stock by 20%." Id.
' The directors formally trace their legal responsibility to run the
corporation to the state corporation law statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
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applies whenever managers are independent, informed, and
acting in good faith on behalf of the corporation.4 5
When corporate officers accept a takeover offer, their
decision is reviewed according to the standard of care
defined by Smith v. Van Gorkom.45 Although Van Gorkom
applied the business judgment .rule to a decision to sell a
corporation at a premium over the stock price, it modified
the traditionally deferential test to require deliberation and
procedural safeguards in takeover and merger situations.
Despite the Pritzker offer's premium over the stock price,
the Van Gorkom court held the directors of the Trans Union
corporation personally liable to its shareholders for failing
to properly value the company prior to selling it to the
Pritzker family. Although the Van Gorkom opinion formally
defined the duty of care in terms of "gross negligence", its
actual decision ushered in a stricter definition of "care"
than past decisions by requiring officers to set up an
"appropriately deliberative" decision-making process before
selling the company.'
Although the Delaware courts retained a modified
version of the business judgment rule for situations in
which the target's management accepted an offer, they
unequivocally dispensed with the rule for situations in
which the target rejected or sought to fight off an offer. In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' the Delaware
Supreme Court substituted an enhanced scrutiny test for
evaluating the propriety of defensive conduct of incumbent
Board members in response to takeover bids. Prior to
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court had held the business
judgment rule generally applicable to takeovers.4 9
Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court now held,
"Iblecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of
4

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
46 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
' AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111

(Del. Ch. 1986).
4"493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
4
1

See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
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the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced
duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred."50
Whereas Van Gorkom was concerned with the officer
and director's proper exercise of care, Unocal was written
with a different fiduciary duty in mind: loyalty. Despite the
absence of self-dealing or corporate opportunities in the
strict doctrinal sense, the Delaware Supreme Court
nevertheless worried that managers would place their own
interests (entrenchment) over that of their shareholders
when control of the company was at stake. At the same
time, the Unocal court recognized that some target defenses
were legitimate, even desirable, if bidders were able to
coerce target shareholders into tendering their stock at
unfair prices. The challenge was to adopt a screen that
separated "good" defenses from the "bad" ones without
overly engaging courts in second-guessing and matters of
business judgment.
The Unocal court therefore adopted an "enhanced
scrutiny" test. It would not be as deferential to the
directors' and officers' expertise as the business judgment
rule, but it would not be as detailed and questioning as the
"entire fairness" test, which attached whenever self-dealing
was present.5" First, directors had to identify some threat to
shareholder welfare justifying their defensive reaction.52
Second, their response had to be proportional to the threat
they were seeking to avert.'
50Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
Directors must demonstrate "utmost good faith and loyalty"
whenever they possess a personal interest in the corporate transaction
that will not be dispersed equally to all of the shareholders. The courts
therefore apply an "entire fairness" test to these types of transactions,
whereby the directors must show both fair price and fair dealing. See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
52 "[D]irectors
must show that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person's stock ownership." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
"If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id.
5

3
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In theory, Unocal should provide shareholders with the
power to compel takeovers when they feel that management
has unfairly blocked a bid; in fact, challenges brought under
Unocal's enhanced scrutiny standard often fail.' Generally,
target managers can 'just say no" when they wish to fight a
tender offer or bid for the target's shares.55 Once the
corporation has been "put in play" however, and a change in
corporate control is inevitable, the target managers' actions
come under closer scrutiny. They cannot pick and choose
between bidders based on personal preference or
guarantees of a job following the takeover. Rather, they
must ensure that target shareholders will receive the "best"
price for the value of their stock. In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 5 the Delaware court
held that when the breakup of a company becomes
"inevitable," the directors' duties change "from the
preservation [of the company] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
' Although directors still retain a
stockholder's benefit. 57
considerable amount of latitude in deciding which bid is the
"better" offer for shareholders, 5 they nevertheless are

The Delaware court approved of the board's exclusive share

repurchase in Unocal. See also Moran v. Household Int'l., Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985) (approval of poison pill).
6s The fact that target managers can adopt a 'Just say no" defense
might undermine my argument that target shareholders receive judicial
protection when they wish to compel target managers to let them tender
their shares. Nevertheless, Unocal review does differ substantially from
the business judgment rule by allowing shareholders to go to court and
challenge the target management's defense tactics. Even if target
managements normally win these challenges, they still must set aside
corporate funds to defend themselves in court. At some point, the cost of
defending their tactics will enter into the target management's decision
whether or not to defend against a takeover. In this sense, shareholder
litigation acts as a monitor over target management's response to wouldbe acquirers.
' 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
"7Id. at 182.
In assessing the bid:
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expected to promote, "the highest values reasonably
attainable for the stockholders' benefit."59 Many scholars
have since debated whether or not auctions actually protect
target shareholders. Whereas Easterbrook and Fischel
criticize auctions as making the takeover process more
expensive and thus reducing the number of bids, several
scholars have responded that bidders can protect
themselves by buying some target stock prior to making the
first bid. °
Much litigation has since followed concerning what
activity "triggers" Revlon duties.6 Although courts have
[tihe board may under appropriate circumstances consider
the inadequacy of the bid, the nature and timing of the
offer, questions of illegality, the impact on constituencies
other than shareholders, the risk of nonconsummation, and
the basic stockholder interests at stake, including the past
actions of the bidder and its affiliates in other takeover
contests.
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42
(Del. 1987).
" Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A2d 1261, 1264 (Del.
1988).
For general argument against auctions, see Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing that auctions make bidding more expensive,
reduce number of bids, and thereby harm target shareholders by
reducing managerial discipline). Easterbrook and Fischel's argument has
met substantial resistance from academics and lawmakers. See Lucian
Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingTender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028
(1982) (arguing that coercive nature of tender offer demands that target
shareholders receive protection provided by auction) and Bebchuk, The
Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids
Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN L. REv. 51 (1982).
f" "The [Revlon] duty does not apply to all takeovers. Rather, it
applies during the break -up' of a company or when the board facilitates
a 'sale' or 'change in control' of a corporation." Alexander B. Johnson, Is
Revlon Only Cosmetic?: Structuring a Merger in the Mid-1990s, 63
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2271, 2282 (1995). In Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), the Delaware Supreme Court
held that a long-term business plan to complete a merger of "equals"
between Time and Warner was not a "sale" and therefore did not trigger
auction duties. "After Time-Warner, a change in control will not occur if
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discussed the target directors' duty to uphold standards of
fairness in maintaining an auction,62 little has been said
about when an auction must (or can) end. 3
In contrast to target shareholders, bidder shareholders
enjoy substantially less access to judicial review when
acquisitions are about to be or have been completed by their
managers. In part, this is because the Delaware judiciary
has constructed its takeover doctrine with one and only one
group in mind: target shareholders. Van Gorkom, Unocal,
and Revlon are designed to minimize the agency costs
between target shareholders and their managers by
restraining management's discretion - in increasing
degrees - when takeovers are imminent.

Sometimes the Delaware judiciary incidentally aids
bidder shareholders by protecting targets. That certainly
was the case with Van Gorkom and its definition of "care"
in terms of process and deliberation. If target managers
cannot sell the company without adequately informing
themselves about the product they are about to sell, then by
the same token, bidder managers cannot buy a company
without engaging in the same type of process of
deliberation.
Unfortunately, bidder shareholders have little protection
in the courts beyond that provided by Van Gorkom. One of
the few decisions addressing a string of "defensive"
control remains vested in a widely dispersed public." Johnson, supra at
2292. The Delaware Supreme Court further clarified Revlon's application
in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1993), in which it held that a transfer of control from dispersed
public shareholders to a single shareholder constituted a "sale of control"
and therefore triggered the Revlon duty to get the highest price for the
shareholder's stock.
Mills, 559 A.2d at 1264.
For an interesting account of how supposedly "final" bids turned
into a series of successive bids, see the account of bidding for control of
RJR Nabisco in BRYAN BURROUGH & JoHN HELYAR, BARBARiANS AT THE

GATE 472-503 (1990). The failure of the courts to specify when auctions
"end" arguably contributes to uncertainty in bidding, higher bids, and
ultimately, overpayment for target shares at the expense of the bidder
shareholder.
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acquisitions, Panter v. Marshall Field,"'strongly rebuffed
any suggestion that the management's acquisition should
be reviewed according to anything other than the business
judgment rule. Panter was decided several years before
Unocal (and in the Seventh Circuit). Since Unocal, no court
has addressed the continuing viability of Panter's holding
regarding defensive acquisitions. Even if courts held that
defensive acquisitions do fall under Unocal's heightened
standard of review and thus require proportionality, one
can easily imagine that managers would deny the
"defensive" nature of the acquisitions and instead point to
some imagined synergies between the two companies."'
Whatever the case, bidder shareholders currently enjoy
only the protection provided by Van Gorkom's processoriented definition of the directors' duty of care.6 6 Provided
the bidder's management
conducts
a reasonably
deliberative process to evaluate the target's worth, its
actions will not be questioned on judicial review.
C. State and Federal Regulation of the Takeover
Process
A third source of takeover protection for target
shareholders is the regulation of takeovers effected by
federal laws.' Of the federal legal protections, the Williams

" 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). "The plaintiffs also contend that the
'defensive' acquisitions .

.

. were imprudent, and designed to make

[Marshall] Field's less attractive as an acquisition as well as to

exacerbate any antitrust problems created by the [proposed] merger. It is
precisely this sort of Monday-morning-quarterbackingthat the business
judgment rule was intended to prevent." Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
6' Moreover, even if Unocal were to apply in this situation, the
shareholder still would have no extra protection when the acquisition
was the result of managerial hubris or mistaken judgment.
' "[Clourts have treated acquisitions as involving no conflict of
interest for the acquirer's managers and, accordingly, have applied the
business judgment rule to such cases rather than the stricter standard
that would apply to self-dealing." Dent, supra note 11, at 784.
7 Anti-takeover laws within this discussion have been excluded
because I think it is highly questionable that they protect shareholders
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Act provides the best example of the asymmetrical
treatment of target and bidder shareholders. The Williams
Act68 creates a de facto auction period by outlawing surprise
tender offers, mandating disclosure by potential bidders,
and setting limits on a tender offeror's ability to make
coercive two tier offers.69 This allows target shareholders
the time and freedom necessary to make a rational decision
about selling their shares. In particular, the Act requires
would-be acquirers to disclose their intentions when they
acquire more than five percent of a class of stock in the
corporation."0 In addition, § 14(d) requires any offeror who
would own more than five percent of the stock once a tender
offer were completed to disclose "the purpose of the tender
offer and its plans or proposals for the target.'M Finally, the
Williams Act protects target shareholders by requiring a
minimum offer period of twenty days,7 2 by mandating a
"best price rule" for offerors who increase the consideration
of the tender offer such that the best price extends to all
shareholders, 3 and by requiring that the tender offeror
extend proration rights to all shareholders who tender stock
when the stock exceeds the number of shares desired by the
offeror. 4
Although the Williams Act has been criticized as
harming target shareholders by making bidding costs too
from coercive bids. Rather, they tend to allow target managers to
perpetuate themselves in office.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1994).
'Two-tier" offers, are offers in which the bidder offers a high price
for a certain amount of stock, and then freezes out the remaining
stockholders at a much lower price. This type of tender offer forces
stockholders to tender their stock out of fear that they will be left in the
second group. If the average price offered for the target is less than its
actual worth, one can argue that target shareholders are unfairly coerced
into transferring their wealth to the bidder. For a general overview and
discussion of the Williams Act and literature about two-tier tender offers,
see ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, §§ 13.3, 13.4 (1986).
7017 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1993).
7 CLARK, supra note 69, at 549.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1993).
73 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1993).
7117 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1993).
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expensive and thereby reducing takeover activity,7" it is
clear that the law at least attempts to clothe target
shareholders with legal protection from overreaching
bidders.76

D. Appraisal Rights
Appraisal rights provide the minority shareholder with a
method of opting out of a merger even if all of the other
shareholders conclude that the deal offered to them is fair.
Appraisal rights do not prevent the merger from taking
place; rathei, they force the majority shareholders that
favor the merger to pay the minority shareholders "fair
value" in exchange for their shares.77 Under Delaware law,
the appraisal process provides the minority stockholder
with judicial process to determine the fair value of his
stock, provided he does not vote for the merger.7 8
The minority shareholder is entitled to a proportionate
interest in the going-concern value of the target corporation
as of the date of the merger.79 Most commentators have
7"See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981). See also Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 691 (1988) (criticizing Williams Act's
"best price" rule).
76See note 59 supra.
7 "Appraisal rights are a liability rule that allows the majority
shareholders to accomplish a merger by compensating the dissenting
minority with judicially-determined damages for the breach of a
corporate contract right." Angie Woo, Note, Appraisal Rights in Mergers
of Publicly-HeldDelawareCorporations:Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, and Something B.L.U.E., 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 719,
728 (1995).
7""Any stockholder of a corporation... who holds shares of stock on
the date of the making of a demand pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section... who continuously holds such shares through the effective date
of the merger or consolidation ... and who has neither voted in favor of
the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto ... shall be entitled to
an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares of

stock
79 ...

."

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1991).

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h).
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construed Delaware's appraisal statute as excluding from
the minority shareholder's remedy any value created by the
proposed merger. 8 Recently, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court altered this assumption somewhat when it
held that when the acquirer initiates a two-step
transaction,8 ' the minority shareholder is entitled to the
value created by the acquirer's plans for the combined
entity, provided that value is nonspeculative." One
commentator has praised this decision, and predicts that it
might discourage acquirers from engaging in otherwise
unworthy transactions.' Others have suggested, however,
See, e.g., CLARK, supranote 69, at 452-53.
81

A two-step acquisition is one in which the acquirer first purchases a
majority stake in the target and then later purchases the rest of the
minority stock (commonly called a "freeze-out" transaction) at a later
time. See generally Jesse A. Finklestein & Russell C. Siberglied,
Technicolor IV-Appraisal Valuation in a Two-Step Merger, 52 Bus. LAW.
801 (1997). The two-step structure is considered desirable because it does
not require immediate financing by the acquirer and allows the acquirer
to gain access to nonpublic information about the target prior to making
its bid for the minority shareholders' stake in the corporation. Id. at 807.
' See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). The
Cede court rejected the contention that Delaware's appraisal statute
excluded value generated by a planned acquisition when the merger had
not yet taken place: "[Vialue added to the going concern by the 'majority
acquiror,' during the transient period of a two-step merger, accrues to the
benefit of all shareholders and must be included in the appraisal process
on the date of the merger." Id. at 298-99. Cede in turn, was based on
Weinberger v. UOP., Inc., which provided that "elements of future value,
including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of
proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation, may
be considered." 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). In a two-step acquisition,
"the date of the merger" apparently is construed to be the date of the
completion of the second step, i.e., the day the acquirer purchases the
minority shareholders' interest in the target.
"3 See Recent Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1943-44 (1997). "A
minority shareholder contributes to the investment cost required in a
two-step takeover to the extent that the acquirer uses material,
nonpublic information about the target, which is the property of all the
shareholders, in formulating his business plan. When the acquirer's
business plan remains valued or undeveloped until he obtains a
controlling stake, which then gives him access to and use of proprietary
information about the target, the value arising from the transaction is
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that since an acquirer's plans for the target are usually less

well defined (and therefore more likely to create only
"speculative" value) in a one-step acquisition, the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision may simply have the effect of
encouraging all acquirers to abandon the two-step structure
for future acquisitions.84 In any event, target shareholders
are benefited by the decision.
Appraisal rights do not apply in all mergers. Of special
importance is the "stock market exception", which precludes

use of the remedy if the target corporation is a widely held
public corporation.' There are two exceptions to the stock
market exception: (i) short form mergers 6 , and (ii) mergers
in which the shareholder receives cash instead of the
surviving corporation's stock as consideration."
less like prospective value directly attributable to the acquirer's efforts
and more like the taking of a preexisting corporate opportunity...."
"[The Delaware Supreme Court's decision] diminishes the
desirability of using a two-step acquisition structure because, in some
cases, the acquirer might be forced to pay a substantially higher
appraisal price after the second step merger than the acquirer would in a
one-step transaction." Finklestein & Siberglied, supra note 81, at 807.
"' See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(1)(1991). A widely held
corporation is one that (i)
is listed on a national securities exchange, or
(ii) is held by more than 2000 stockholders.
6See DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8 § 262(b)(3)(1991): "In the event all of the
stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a [short form merger]
is not owned by the parent corporation, immediately prior to the merger,
appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of the subsidiary
Delaware corporation." Under Delaware law, a short-form merger is a
merger in which the acquiring corporation already owns ninety percent
of the stock in the target corporation. Voting rights do not attach to
target shareholders in the short-form merger scenario. Therefore,
appraisal rights are considered necessary to protect minority
shareholders from being cheated out of the value of their stock.
87See DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8 § 262(b)(2)(1991) (stating that appraisal
rights are available if the consideration for the shareholder's stock is
cash). "[Ihf the merger consideration is equity of the surviving firm, the
minority shareholder does not have a self-dealing concern ex post
because all shareholders are treated the same and retain an equity
interest in the surviving corporation." Woo, supra note 77, at 736. On the
other hand, if the consideration for the minority shareholders' shares is
cash, there is more fear that they have indeed been "frozen out", based on
a distrust of the efficient market hypothesis. See note 81, supra.
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In the past, appraisal rights were justified as a method
of ensuring liquidity for the minority shareholder wishing
to exit a fundamentally changed enterprise, following a
merger or takeover. Today, however, appraisal rights are
justified as an efficient way of preventing self-dealing
between majority shareholders and the corporation.8
Without the appraisal process, a majority shareholder
would have the ability to freeze out a minority shareholder
for a portion of the fair value of the stock. The appraisal
remedy, on the other hand, forces the majority shareholder
(or the acquirer) to pay a "fair price" to the tendering
shareholder for the value of his stock. Fair price, in turn,
can be calculated according to "any valuation technique
commonly accepted in the financial community." 89
Since many of the mergers now taking place are stock
for stock transactions, and many of the companies involved
are publicly traded, it is questionable how important the
appraisal remedy will be to dissenting target shareholders
throughout the current wave of mergers and acquisitions.
Nevertheless, it is yet another example of legal protection
that protects target shareholders from coercive transfers of
wealth to bidders.
E. Conclusion
The legal mechanisms discussed above are not the only
sources of legal protection for target shareholders, and they
are not without their drawbacks. Nevertheless, voting
rights, judicial review, the Williams Act, and the
(concededly limited) opting-out rights provided by the
appraisal remedy, provide target shareholders with a
considerable amount of protection from self-interested
' "Now the remedy serves as a check against opportunism by a
majority shareholder in mergers and other transactions in which the
majority forces minority shareholders out of the business and requires
them to accept cash for their shares." Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal'sRole in CorporateLaw, 84 GEO.
L.J. 1, 4 (1995). See also Woo, supranote 77, at 727-32.
"'Weinberger,457 A.2d at 712.
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managers and bidders and ensure the target shareholder at
least a portion of the difference between the stock market
price and the "actual value" of the stock.
In contrast, none of the legal mechanisms discussed in
this section attempt to protect bidder shareholders from the
losses of value created by bad deals. Asymmetry in the legal
treatment of target and bidder shareholders clearly exists.
Of course, if most or all mergers are justified and provide
gains to bidder shareholders, there is little reason to be
concerned by this anomaly. The next section of this paper
therefore examines some common justifications for takeover
premiums and then reviews some of the most recent
financial literature discussing the health of the bidder
shareholder's investment after the merger has taken place.
IV. How ACQUISITIONS AFFECT BIDDER SHAREHOLDERS:
THEORY AND FACTS
Part III demonstrated the ways in which bidder
shareholders receive less legal protection than shareholders
of target firms. This section examines whether that
difference in legal protection is justified. First, I review the
competing theories that attempt to explain why supposedly
rational bidders offer such high premiums over market
price for the target shareholders' stock. Depending on which
theory is used to justify a merger or its attendant premium
over the target's stock price, the bidder shareholder should
either (i) remain indifferent, (ii) rejoice over his good
fortune, or (iii) register strong disapproval and discontent
when his corporation decides to proceed with an acquisition.
After discussing the competing theories, I then survey
financial and economic literature examining the empirical
effect of takeovers and mergers on the value of the bidder
shareholder's stock. Although the evidence is not
conclusive, it nevertheless suggests that bidder
shareholders lose at least some of the time, and that these
losses might be prevented (or perhaps compensated) by
some type of legal reform.
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A. Justification for Mergers
Mergers, and the premium bidders pay for the target
corporations' stock, are justified or explained by many
competing theories.' Although these theories differ
considerably, they can be classified in three general
categories: stock market inefficiency, wealth creation, and
wealth transfer.9' The theories falling under the "stock
market inefficiency" heading assume, for various reasons,
that the stock market fails to convey to investors accurate
information about the "true" value of the corporation. The
"wealth creation" heading, on the other hand, assumes
market efficiency and includes those theories most often
used to justify merger premiums: synergy and managerial
discipline. Finally, the "wealth transfer" heading includes
those theories that suggest that the bidder corporation has
engaged in overbidding, and by doing so, has harmed its
shareholders.

In analyzing these theories, Professor Romano has noted, "[We do
not have a comprehensive theory of takeovers. Different theories do well
at explaining various subsets of acquisitions, but no theory satisfactorily
explains all." Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence
and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 120 (1992). Romano goes on to
argue that "[tihe empirical evidence is most consistent with valuemaximizing, efficiency-based explanations of takeovers." Id. The thesis of
this section is that Romano's assessment is incorrect.
9' Professor Romano has classified competing explanations into
"value-maximizing" and "non-value-maximizing" explanations. Id. See
also Kraakman, supranote 26, at 893: "Three possibilities might occur to
an observer who first learned that acquirers routinely pay large premia
over share price for the assets of target firms: (1) acquirers may be
discovering more valuable uses for target assets; (2) share prices may
'underprice' these assets; or, finally (3) acquirers may simply be paying
too much." (classifying theories into "traditional" gains hypotheses,
discount hypotheses, and hypotheses based on the premise that the
acquirer has overbid for the target).
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Stock market inefficiency: Information,
Discounts, and Cost of Gaining Control

The theories discussed under this heading assume that
the stock market, on some level, fails to convey the true
value of a corporation's assets and future cash flows to
investors. The "inside information" hypothesis is premised
on the belief that the stock market is inefficient because it
fails to reflect certain inside information as part of the
value of the stock. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH) is premised on the belief that the stock market
adequately reflects all available information about a given
corporation and estimates the future cash flow of the
corporation.' If the ECMH is correct, then any premium
paid over the stock price should represent a real "gain" for
target shareholders. Bidder shareholders, meanwhile,
usually benefit in a world characterized by the ECMH only
if the bidder managers run the combined entity more
efficiently, or if the merger itself creates value-enhancing
synergies.
Some commentators suggest that the huge premiums
offered targets from bidders do not reflect potential synergy
or increased managerial efficiency, but rather inside
information that the market has undervalued the worth of
the particular target firm in question. 3 The inside
92 See generally RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS, Ch. 5 (1986) and Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984). The ECMH exists in three forms. Strong form efficiency assumes
that the market incorporates inside information and public information
about the corporation into the price of the stock. The semi-strong form
hypothesis assumes that the market incorporates all available public
information. The weakest form assumes only that past sequences of
share prices are incorporated into the shares of the stock.
According to Professor Kraakman, the "private information" theory,
"assumes that the market may be uninformed about the real value of
target assets." Kraakman, supra note 26, at 895. Kraakman gives short
shrift to the inside or private information theory in hostile takeover
situations: "Short of hiring informers, hostile acquirers lack access to
inside information about targets." Id. Many of the acquisitions taking
place, today, however, are at least on the surface "friendly" acquisitions.
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information hypothesis provides bidder managers with a
justification for takeover premiums. They are not paying
too much for targets; rather, they are either paying the
"real" value of the firm, or they are paying less than the
computed value of the target and getting a "bargain."'94
Professors Kraakman, Black and Romano, however, have
pointed out that if the "inside information" theory were
correct, target firm prices would not sink to pre-bid levels
once an acquisition was blocked or abandoned by the bidder
since the bidder's premium would itself convey information
about the target's worth to previously uninformed traders."
Yet studies show that stock prices sink to pre-bid levels
once the bidder disappears. 6 Inside information therefore
does not appear to drive acquisitions, or explain the high
premiums that bidders offer to targets.
Several other theories that seek to explain acquisition
premiums assume that the stock market does not always
efficiently predict the future cash flows of all corporations.9 7
Therefore, the information thesis may be worth more than it was five
years ago.
' Since the target shareholders do not receive any true gain, the
bidder's return on investment "does not depend on any operating
improvements or other changes to be undertaken by the bidder in the
future" and the bidder corporation profits from buying a corporation at a
lower price than its intrinsic value. Romano, supra note 90, at 143-44.
"'See Romano, supra note 90, at 144; Black, supra note 16, at 607;
Kraakman, supra note 26, at 895.
" See Romano, supra note 90, at 144 n.103 (citing studies);
Kraakman, supra note 26, at 895 n.12 (also citing studies).
97 Note that this type of inefficiency - the failure of the rational
market hypothesis, that is of stock prices to reflect accurately the
expected future cash flows of the corporation - is different from the type
of inefficiency discussed in conventional ECMH discussions. The first
type of inefficiency is labeled "allocative" inefficiency by Kraakman,
whereas the second concerns the informational efficiency of the market.
The discount theories set forth by Kraakman undermine only the first
type of efficiency. "Note, however, that the distinction between
informational and allocative efficiency is cogent only if the standard
view, the rational market hypothesis, is suspect." Kraakman, supra note
26, at 898 n.22. "A growing body of work in financial economics now
suggests, first, that informational efficiency - for which there is
substantial empirical support - does not imply fundamental efficiency,
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Professor Kraakman has argued that, at least in some
circumstances, share prices diverge from the actual or
"true" value of the corporation and result in a "discounted"

price." Kraakman identifies two explanations for the
"discounting" of a corporation's shares. The first is known
as the "misinvestment hypothesis," whereby the market
discounts the corporation's shares to reflect the rational
belief that the corporation's managers are likely to
misinvest future cash flows.99 This theory and its effect on
acquisition choices and premiums are discussed later
within Part IV, in conjunction with the managerial
discipline hypothesis.
Professor Kraakman also identifies a second explanation
for share discounts: the "market hypothesis," which asserts
that the share prices themselves are an incorrect valuation
of the corporation's net present value for reasons other than
investors' distrust of managers." The market hypothesis,
in turn, breaks into two types of objections to the stock
market's valuation of a company. 1' First, share prices may
discount the true value of the corporation, "simply because
and, second, that both the empirical and theoretical bases for the belief
that markets are fundamentally efficient are suspect." Robert M. Daines
& Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for
Restructuring CorporateLaw, 102 YALE L. J. 577, 615 (1992) (reviewing
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (citations omitted).
'a Kraakman, supra note 26, at 909: "Large premia are easily
explained if reliable appraisals of large firms can reveal the existence of
market discounts. Under these circumstances, acquirers can calculate
discounts with standard appraisal techniques and thereby learn, within
the limits of appraisal error, whether the bulk of their premia costs are a
simple purchase of assets at their existing values."
"[Tihe 'misinvestment' hypothesis holds that investors rationally
expect managers of target firms to misinvest the future returns on
corporate assets, and discount the value of these assets accordingly." Id.
at 892. The misinvestment theory does not necessarily undermine the
ECMH. Rather, the information it provides results in a discount of the
stock that will be erased as soon as new management is put in place.
100 "On this view, market prices simply fail to reflect informed
estimates
of likely cash flows generated by target firms." Id.
'0 Id. at 898-99.
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assets and shares differ in ways that matter to traders. 10 2
According to Kraakman, traders might discount the target's
stock because of the timing or taxation of distributions or
liquidity concerns. Thus, if the bidder harbors preferences
that differ from those of the trader, the bidder will value
the target's shares more highly and pay more than market
price for the stock. Although this prong of the discount
theory may explain some premiums, it does not explain why
bidders consistently offer premiums as high as 50% (or
higher) over the target's actual stock price, unless one is
willing to believe that all traders substantially discount
their shares accordingly.
A second, and more prominent prong of the market
hypothesis is that the stock market fails to adequately price
corporate worth because of persistent biases that are
introduced into the market by uninformed traders (so-called
"noise trading").1" Noise trading skews the stock market
price by introducing price pressures that have little or
nothing to do with the net present value of the corporation's
future cash flows. Since noise can either depress or elevate
shares, it presumably justifies only some premiums, while
simultaneously undermining others.
On the surface, the first prong of the market hypothesis
- that traders discount stock because of liquidity concerns
- does not appear to explain the premiums offered to
target shareholders in the current merger wave. Kraakman
wrote about discounts in 1988, when most acquisitions were
hostile and characterized by cash payments to target
shareholders. That traders and investors would prefer cash
to stock because of its liquidity makes sense under the
'02Id.

at 899.

"[T]here is a growing theoretical literature on 'mispricing'
behavior, which argues that uninformed traders may introduce
persistent biases or cumulative noise into share prices or that
speculative trading might lead to positive or negative price 'bubbles.'
Large-scale noise trading - arising from misconceived strategies,
erroneous valuation assumptions, fashion and fads, or simple pleasure in
trading - might distort share prices and generate discounts or premia
through the sheer pressure of trading." Id. at 899-900.
"3
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discount theory.' ° Most recent mergers, however, have been
stock for stock deals." 5 If the trader receives another stock
in lieu of target stock, the market price or "discounts"
should remain in place, since the trader will discount what
he receives just as much as he discounts what he gives
away in return. Premiums nevertheless remain a
significant aspect of the typical deal, thus undermining this
prong of Kraakman's discount theory." At any rate,
Kraakman admits that in order for an acquirer to find
another corporation an attractive target, some other source
of wealth must exist alongside the discount itself.0 7 In sum,
although it is highly plausible that discounts exist, they are
only part of the story.
Finally, Professor Lynn Stout set forth a third theory
that attempts to explain bidder premiums apart from
overbidding or promises of future wealth creation.' 8
According to Stout, stock market prices do not reflect the
full value of target corporations; rather they reflect the
marginal value of a particular share of stock.0 9 On any
1o" Id.
at 914-20 (arguing that investors' behavior when shares are
converted to equity supports the discount hypothesis).

'

0

' See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.

"Id. Premiums did, however, decrease in 1996. See supranote 21.
0
7 "The most important way in which discounts can prompt takeovers
is in combination with other sources of acquisition gains such as
operating gains or private information." Kraakman, supra note 26, at
925. The need for an additional motive arises because the bidder often is
forced to participate in an auction for the target, and by doing so,
competes away much of the premium to the target shareholder. Id. at
925-27.
108Stout, supra note 75. See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover
Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) [hereinafter Stout, Takeover Premiums].
See also, Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory, and
the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187
(1993).
109 "In the public trading markets, price is set at that level at which a
limited number of shares have changed hands between a willing buyer
and willing seller in that day's trades. But the bidder who wants to buy
the entire corporation must deal not only with the shareholders willing
to sell at that day's market price, but with those unwilling to do so - the
shareholders who, by declining to sell, have revealed their opinion that
"
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given day, I may value my share of Capital Cities stock
more highly than the current price that reflects existing
demand. Once Disney decides to buy that stock, however, it
must take as much stock as is available. Therefore, it must
pay a higher price to obtain a threshold of control.11 Like
Kraakman, Stout assumes that stock market prices do not
always reflect an informed calculation of the value of the
Her theory,
target corporation's future cash flows.'
on
any
"discounting"
per se: the
however, is not based
marginal price of a corporation's stock presumably always
differs from the price it costs to control the entire entity.
Although Stout's downward sloping demand theory has
been strongly criticized by several scholars,' it offers a
plausible explanation for the market for corporate control.
Nevertheless, her theory of "price pressure" does not dispel
the belief that bidders overpay for target stock, since Stout
freely admits that stock price has little to do with the
fundamental value of the corporation.
It is important to note that the policy implications of the
inside information, discount, and payment for corporate
control hypotheses are not all identical. If inside
information fuels the bidder's premium, nothing need be
done to protect the bidder shareholder, since it is unlikely
that he will lose. Similarly, if the misinvestment discount
has depressed the target's stock, then the takeover
the value of their shares exceeds the valuation of the market." Stout,
supra note 75, at 687-88.
10 "If the bidder who buys a controlling block of shares in a target
firm is 'cornering the market' in a unique good with a limited supply, it
seems natural that buying larger and larger quantities of stock should
inevitably bid up the market price." Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra
note 108, at 1236.
" "While efficient markets may accurately measure the marginal
value of a single share, they tell us little of what the price of a successful
tender offer would be - except that it will likely be greater." Stout,
supra note 75, at 689.
11
See J. Gregory Sidak and Susan E. Woodward, Takeover
Premiums,AppraisalRights and the PriceElasticity of a Firm'sPublicly
Traded Stock, 25 GA. L. REV. 783 (1991) (arguing that Stout's thesis of
downward sloping demand inelasticity of stock is incorrect).
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premiums reflect the true value of the target corporation's
future cash flows, and the acquirer need not increase the
target's productivity following the completion of the
takeover or merger."' On the other hand, if one explains
bidder premiums as a result of price pressure or noise
trading, then one cannot predict with certainty whether or
not the bidder corporation is getting its money's worth.
Already, bidder shareholders may have reason to voice

concern.
Whatever the case, the inside information, discount and
downward sloping demand hypotheses appear to be
inadequate explanations for the size and frequency of
takeover premiums offered above the target's stock market
price. This is not to say that stock prices are perfect
estimates of the future cash flows of target firms, but
rather, that hypotheses based on stock market inefficiency
fail to reflect the full extent of premiums paid to targets."'
Thus, it is not surprising that most bidders justify their
premiums with claims of synergy or better management.
2. Wealth Increasing Justifications
The rfiost predominant wealth increasing justifications
for acquisitions and takeover premiums in general are the
managerial discipline hypothesis and synergy-based
explanations.
The first type of value-maximizing theory that was often
invoked throughout the last takeover wave is the
113

"[Aicquirers learn that their prernia costs largely pay for assets

that are worth the price if they merely continue to perform as they have
in the past." Kraakman, supranote 26, at 909.
..This is supported, in part, by the observations of CEOs in a Law
and Economics conference that took place at Columbia Law School some
years ago. The CEOs "were unanimous in their belief that acquirers are
paying inflated prices" to targets, and yet simultaneously argued "that
prices in the stock market frequently fail to reflect a firm's long-term
prospects under current management." Foreword, KNIGHTS, RAIDERS &
TARGETS, supra note 15, at 3-4. According to this account, corporate
managers believe stock market prices undervalue target firms, but not so
much to justify such high premiums paid by bidders.
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managerial discipline hypothesis. This too has several
variants. At its lowest common denominator, it refers to the
belief that the corporate market for control disciplines lazy
or profligate managers by allowing raiders to buy the
company and then draw profits by cutting fat from the
company."' The profits pay for the acquisition and in turn
scare other managers into doing a more efficient job. The
market for corporate control argument is strengthened by
the perception that shareholders lack the means and
incentive to properly monitor their agents, the corporate
officers. If internal controls break down, external controls
such as the takeover mechanism ensure that management
does not diverge from its job of protecting the shareholders'
interests."' This market control hypothesis, however,
makes most sense in a hostile world. Most mergers today,
however, are "friendly" and sometimes keep the old CEOs
in some variant of their positions."7 It is hard to see, then,
how friendly mergers can justify premiums on this
hypothesis."'
"' "The theory of the 'market for corporate control' asserts that in an
efficient market, hostile tender offers can direct control of the corporation
from unprofitable management to more effective owners ....

When a

bidder offers to buy the corporation at a price higher than market price,
the bidder must believe that under his control the corporation will have
higher earnings than at present." Stout, supra note 75, at 685-86
(emphasis in original); see generally, Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for CorporateControl, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).

" "The internal control mechanisms of corporations, which operate
through the board of directors, generally work well. On occasion,
however, they break down. One important source of protection for
investors in these situations is the takeover market." Michael C. Jensen,
Takeover Controversy, supra note 15, at 318.

" Following Disney's acquisition of Capital Cities/ABC, Cap Cities'
Chairman, Thomas Murphy, joined Disney's Board of Directors and its
CEO, Robert Iger, signed a five-year contract to be president of the
Capital Cities/ABC subsidiary of Disney. See Laura Landro & Elizabeth
Jensen, All Ears: Disney's Deal for ABC Makes Show Business A Whole

New World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1995, at Al. Such was not the case with
IBM's acquisition of Lotus, which eventually resulted in the departure of
Lotus' CEO, Jim Manzi.
118"Only in the context of a hostile offer can stock price 'discipline'
management." See Stout, supra note 75, at 685 n.361.
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A second variant of the managerial discipline hypothesis
is suggested by Kraakman in his exposition of the discount
effect on share prices discussed above. According to
Kraakman, one type of discount is the misinvestment
hypothesis, whereby shareholders rationally discount the
value of the stock based on the belief that managers will
misinvest funds in wasteful projects. Unlike the first
variant of the managerial discipline justification,
Kraakman's misinvestment hypothesis does not require the
acquirer to do a better job with the firm to justify the
takeover premium; rather, the discount itself disappears
because the shareholders' expectations about the old
managers no longer figure in the calculations of the
corporation's internal worth.1 9
The misinvestment hypothesis is in fact closely related
to the third variant of the managerial discipline
justification, Michael Jensen's free-cash flow theory.12
According to Jensen, excess cash flow - cash flow in excess
of money needed to fund all positive net present value
projects for the company - creates an agency problem
between manager and shareholder. Although the manager
should return the cash to the shareholders, he nevertheless
declines to do so since any return of cash would necessarily
restrict future flexibility. 2' Instead, management places
excess cash in negative net present value projects and so
reduces the value of the firm.
Jensen sees acquisitions as a possible solution to the
agency cost of free cash flow because he believes the market
"' "Although the misinvestment hypothesis is conceptually related to
traditional accounts of acquisition gains arising from improvements in
the operational management of target firms, there is an important
difference. Ongoing mismanagement of targets' assets reduces their cash
flows. Thus, low share prices may accurately mirror the value of
mismanaged target assets; there may be no discounts. By contrast, under
the misinvestment hypothesis, discounts can arise even though targets'
assets are put to their best uses." Kraakman, supranote 26, at 898.
120"Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all
projects that positive net present values when discounted at the relevant
cost1of
capital." Jensen, Takeover Controversy, supra note 15, at 321.
21
Id.
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for corporate control encourages managers to disgorge the

cash to shareholders rather than waste it on negative net
present value projects. The key element of the motivational
mechanism, however, is debt. By using debt to take over an

entity, the acquiring firm is locked into a relationship with
its creditors that forces it to be efficient and disgorge excess

cash flow to its rightful owners (now the creditors)."
Jensen's theory of excess cash flow as a justification for
takeovers is especially inapt in the current wave of mergers

and acquisitions. First, stock, not excess cash, funded many
of the mergers in 1995. Jensen himself notes the difference

between stock for stock and cash for stock transactions.'23
Moreover, debt no longer plays the role it once did in
leveraged buyouts. Thus, the agency theory of free cash flow
well as a justification for today's takeover
does not12function
4
activity.

The second type of value-maximizing explanation voiced
as a justification for mergers or takeovers is the synergy
explanation. "Synergy" is a generic term used by managers
to describe the increased wealth that results from the
unique combination of two firms: in other words, the sum
equals more than its parts. Since fewer deals are hostile in
the current merger and acquisition wave, synergy has
emerged as the primary justification issued by corporate
managers for acquisitions and their ever larger premiums.
The most traditional synergy explanations are
traditional economy of scale and scope theories. One large
entity, corporate managers assume, can more easily and
more cheaply produce and distribute a product than two

" See generally Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 15, for discussion of
value of debt in reducing agency and monitoring costs.
'23 "Stock acquisitions tend to be different from debt or cash
acquisitions and are more likely to be associated with growth
opportunities and a shortage of free cash flow. They therefore represent a
fundamentally different phenomenon from the nongrowth - or exit motivated acquisitions that have been occurring in the 1980's." Jensen,
Takeover Controversy, supra note 15, at 335-36.
...The free cash flow theory, however, does work quite well as an
explanation of premiums as wealth transfers. See discussion infra.
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smaller ones." The economy of scope idea is slightly
different: one large corporation can market and distribute
two related products more cheaply than two smaller
firms 2 6 Lately, synergy explanations have focused on the
benefits of vertical integration, 2 ' size for competition in a
global market,2 ' and one of the newest explanations,
growth through acquisition.'29 "Synergy" can have a coercive
effect on whole industries; indeed, once several corporations
within an industry begin to merge, remaining corporations
feel the need to join together to be able to compete with
their new and larger competitors. Finally, "synergy" may
well be a more euphemistic term for "monopoly," as rival
firms combine with little or no comment from federal
'25This

type of thinking has in part motivated consolidation within
the financial services industry, where the goal "is to squeeze out costs
and earn economies of scale." Mandel, supranote 1.
126
This type of thinking drove Anheuser Busch's acquisition of Eagle
Foods, a snack concern, 18 years ago. Busch assumed that beer and
snacks could be distributed and marketed in the same manner, since
consumers usually eat snacks with their beer. Unfortunately for Busch,
the expected synergies did not materialize because snack foods and beer
are placed in different parts of convenience stores and therefore are not
so easily distributed and marketed together as one would think.
Recently, Busch announced that due to its inability to make a profit out
of Eagle, it was abandoning - not even selling - the snack business,
salvaging only $135 million from a sale of four plants to competitor FritoLay. Richard A. Melcher & Greg Burns, How Eagle Became Extinct, BUS.
WK., March 4, 1996, at 68.
127 Vertical integration is the combination
of two firms within a
related field to ensure the acquiring firm access to markets through
owning its own distribution channels. A particularly good example of the
vertical integration motive is present in Disney's acquisition of
ABC/Capital Cities, as well *as Viacom's (overpriced) acquisition of
Paramount. The vertical integration explanation is especially salient in
the entertainment industry because of changing technology. See The
Price of Mogulmania, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 16.
"2Examples of such types of synergy abound in the banking industry,
where Chemical Bank and Chase Manhattan recently announced their
billion dollar merger to compete globally with other banks. See Mandel,
supranote 1, at 34.
'
IBM reportedly bought Lotus because it was the fastest way it
could shore 'up its sagging software division. See discussion at note 24,
supra.
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regulators, increase market share, and then expropriate
wealth from consumers through significantly higher prices.
Although synergy (minus its monopolistic implication) is
an attractive thesis from a social welfare standpoint, the
problem is that it is too often and easily invoked by bidder
corporations. Despite every manager's best intentions, some
synergies never surface in quite the way or scope imagined
prior to the merger. Moreover, synergies can be competed
away by similar bidders if the target holds an auction for
sale of the company. Finally, some synergies, such as those
created by vertical integration, can be outweighed by their
costs, such as limited flexibility in distribution of product.13

3. Wealth Transfers
The final group of theories seeking to explain
motivations for acquisitions and their accompanying
premiums assume the worst; namely, that the acquisitions
represent wealth transfers from bidder shareholders to
target shareholders. Several theories fall under this
heading. 3'

' One business professor criticized Disney's acquisition of ABC and
other acquisitions motivated by vertical integration as short-sided and
likely to cause inefficiency in the future. "The notion of a captive (i.e., inhouse) customer of a captive supplier is a dangerous one because it often
leads to uneconomic decision-making and can seriously hurt the
competitiveness of the integrated company. . . . Moreover, it has the
almost immediate impact of inspiring counter-alliances from rivals,
negating many of its supposed benefits." Rajendra S. Sisodia, A Goofy
Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at A8.
231 Some academics argue that acquisition premiums represent
involuntary wealth transfers from other groups, such as employees,
bondholders, consumers or taxpayers, to the target shareholders. This
group of "expropriation" theories has been rejected by most observers of
merger activity. See Black, supra note 16, at 611 (discussing and
dismissing most theories of wealth transfers from other groups). See also
Romano, supranote 90, at 133-43 (same). Although the monopoly-driven
view of acquisitions may have more bite in the current merger and
acquisition wave, it is outside of the scope of this paper and probably too
early to decide whether or not antitrust policy needs to change to protect
against excessive consolidation of firms within the same industry.
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The most widely voiced objection to acquisitions is that
they are constructed solely for the benefit of ego-driven
managers and not for the true welfare of shareholders.
According to the empire-building hypothesis, corporate
managers seek acquisitions in order to increase the size of
the corporation and to enjoy corresponding increases in
prestige and compensation.132 Several studies suggest that
management's stock ownership in the firm affects the value
of its acquisitions." Other studies appear to lend support to
the "empire building" hypothesis that managers initiate
acquisitions as a result of desires to improve status,
compensation and prestige."
Another "managerialist" explanation for acquisitions is
the so-called "hubris" hypothesis. Related in part to the
concept of "empire building," the hubris hypothesis holds
'3 See Dent, supra note 11, at 781: "Corporate managers may seek
growth of firm size rather than maximization of share price in order to
justify better compensation and perquisites, to increase prestige, to
expand opportunities for promotion, and perhaps most importantly to
protect themselves from the discipline of the market. In short, they often
engage in empire building."
" See Romano, supra note 90, at 148-49 (citing studies illustrating
positive relationship between management's ownership of stock and
acquiring shareholders' stock returns).
"uCoffee identifies several motivations that might fuel management's
desire for growth over profitability and shareholder welfare. "Several
plausible reasons explain why management would pursue growth
through acquisitions and pay an economically unjustified premium to
achieve increased size: (1) executive compensation and associated
perquisites tend to be a function of firm size; (2) increased size in turn
implies increased immunity from a hostile takeover; (3) acquisitions
dilute the stockholdings of existing large shareholders and thereby confer
increased autonomy on the management of the bidder; and (4) expansion
both provides an opportunity for advancement within the corporate
hierarchy for younger managers and justifies the continued employment
of those who are acquisition specialists." Coffee, supra note 13, at 1224.
Coffee cites (early) data supporting this hypothesis, and concludes,
"Much empirical data suggest that these wealth transfers occur
frequently, but it is considerably more difficult to argue that they
predominate. Nonetheless, the Empire Building Hypothesis suggests
that the most important conflict of interests in corporate control contests
may be on the bidder's side of the transaction - between the interests of
the bidder's management and those of its own shareholders." Id. at 1168.
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that managers overpay for targets because they
overestimate their ability to extract value from the targets.
A recent Columbia Business school study conducted by
Mathew Hayward and Professor Donald Hambrick suggests
that this theory might be correct in some instances. 35
According to the business school study, which examined 106
publicly traded American
companies
involved in
acquisitions that cost more than 100 million dollars in two
years (1989 and 1992), three factors predispose managers
towards engaging in acquisition activity and paying high
premiums for targets. First, recent instances of corporate
success provide CEOs with "an inflated notion of their
organizational genius, as well as a pile of cash with which
to foist that genius on the wider world."'3 6 The second factor
is the gap between the managers' salaries and those held by
second highest paid executive within the company. "In our
study, the higher the salary ratio [between CEO and his
less well paid colleagues], the higher the acquisition
premium."'3 7 Finally, the third factor determining whether
managers engage in high-premium acquisitions is the
" The study was performed as a doctoral dissertation by Mathew
Hayward and a business professor, Donald Hambrick. The results of
their study was presented in August, 1995 at the Academy of
Management in Vancouver. Mathew L. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick,
Michael Eisner's Tragic Flaw: Excerpt from 'ExplainingPremiums Paid
for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris,' HARPER'S MAGAZINE,

Oct. 1995, at 24. See also Acquisitive Egos: Managers and Shareholders,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1995, at 52. See also Dent, supra note 11, at 781
n.20 (citing less recent studies for proposition that executive ego fuels
merger decisions).
...
Acquisitive Egos, supra note 135. "CEOs tend to attribute their
company's success to managerial excellence rather than to market trends
or other external causes; as a result, CEOs of successful companies
believe that their company is primed for entirely new challenges."
Hayward & Hambrick, supra note 135.
137According to Hayward and Hambrick, the CEOs' confidence and
belief in oneself, "plays a role in their strategic choices, including the
premiums they pay in large acquisitions. Our measure of [CEO] selfimportance was the ratio of the CEO's pay to that of the second-highestpaid executive in the firm, which we took to be a telling indicator of the
CEO's sense of potency and self-esteem." Hayward & Hambrick, supra
note 135.
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amount of (good) media attention the manager has received
prior to the announcement of the acquisition. 8 All of these
motives support the inference that acquisition premiums
represent wealth transfers from bidder shareholders to
target shareholders, and furthermore undermine the
argument that takeovers and mergers are socially beneficial
and should be encouraged through policy.
Hambrick and Hayward's conclusions were only recently
released. They are not the first academics, however, to
suggest managerial (over)expectations as an acquisition
motive. In 1986, Richard Roll suggested that hubris, the
manager's expectation that he can do more with a target
firm than is actually possible, fuels many acquisitions."9
According to Roll, an important component of the acquirer's
decision to buy a target is the valuation of the target's
worth plus synergy or increased managerial efficiency. The
"hubris hypothesis" assumes that the manager's valuation
of the firm is too high because the manager has an inflated
opinion of how much he can improve the target following
completion of the acquisition. According to Roll, the
manager need not consciously wish to harm his
shareholders; rather, he deludes himself into thinking that
he is improving the company with each new acquisition. 4
In addition to hubris, another motivation that might fuel
management's acquisition is the desire to protect itself from
being a target in the future. Although "defensive
, M "In our sample, each highly favorable article about the CEO
resulted, on average, in a 5.4 percent increase in a premium paid." Id.
" Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of CorporateTakeovers, 59 J.
Bus. L. 197, 198 (1986):
The mechanism by which takeover attempts are initiated
and consummated suggests that at least part of the large
price increases observed in target firm shares might
represent a simple transfer from the bidding firm, that is,
that the observed takeover premium . . . overstates the

increase in economic value of the corporate combination.
"°"Management intentions may be fully consistent with honorable
stewardship of corporate assets, but actions need not always turn out to
be right." Roll, supra note 139, at 214.
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acquisitions" clearly exist,'

it is difficult to calculate their

number with precision since management's defensive
motives may be well hidden at the time of the
announcement of the acquisition. For example, when Novell
announced in 1994 that it would buy WordPerfect, it had
already been approached two years earlier by Microsoft in
secret negotiations to buy it for 10 billion dollars. Due to
culture clashes and the failure of synergies to materialize,
Novell lost much of its value and announced that it would
sell the WordPerfect division - for much less than the price
it paid to acquire it.'
Sometimes, the bidder may have chosen a target that
offers real synergies but then destroys these potential
sources by falling prey to the "winner's curse." Unlike the
hubris or empire-building hypotheses, the "winner's curse"
hypothesis does not criticize the bidder's initial valuation of
the target. Rather, the winner's curse theory is tied to the
manager's inability to adjust his bid downward when
participating in an auction. When a bidder enters an
auction and he is uncertain about the value of the target, he
should rationally adjust his bid downward as the number of
participants in the auction increases. The inclination of
bidders, however, is to do just the opposite and adjust his
4 "Winner's curse
bid upward in order to win the auction."
See Panter v. Marshall Field, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (refusing to review Marshall Field's decision to
acquire the Galleria and several other purchases in order to create more
antitrust problems for the would-be buyer).
142 Don Clark, Novel Nouveau: Software Firm Fights
to Remake
BusinessAfter Ill-FatedMerger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1996, at Al.
1

4
See generally, RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CuRsE,
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE, Ch. 5 (1992). Thaler

writes that Roll's data concerning the hubris hypothesis are consistent
with the winner's curse theory as well. Professor Romano also provides a
helpful explanation of the winner's curse phenomenon: "When the value
to the bidders of the auctioned item is uncertain, the person who has
overestimated the value the most will be the winner. This is because a
positive evaluation error produces a winning bid, but a negative error
does not. The intuition is that the winning bidder pays too much - that
is why he is the winner. Winning is bad news (a "curse") because it
signifies that all other bidders' estimates were lower. That is, the winner
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theory dictates that bidders must offer substantially less
than they think an asset is worth, and be prepared to have
only a fraction of their bids succeed."1" Most bidders,
unfortunately, do just the opposite. Despite their advisor's
presumed knowledge of the phenomenon, they are too
interested in completing a deal to tell the managers to bid
low. 4 ' Moreover, managers do not necessarily always learn
from mistakes such as these since they are not always able
to attribute
later failures to the overbidding for target
146
stock.

had the highest positive evaluation error." Romano, supra note 90, at
150-51.
24 Black, supra note 16, at 625. Roll sees a connection between
hubris-fueled bids and auction theory:
Rational bidders will realize that valuations are subject to
error and that negative errors are truncated in repeated
bids. They will take this into account when making a bid.
Takeover attempts are thus analogous to the auctions
discussed in bidding theory wherein the competing bidders
make public offers. In the takeover situation, the initial
bidder is the market, and the initial public offer is the
current price.
Roll, supranote 139, at 200.
1" "I know of no evidence that the investment bankers who advise
managers on takeover bids, let alone corporate managers themselves,
know anything about winner's curse theory. My personal experience as a
takeover lawyer is that they do not." Black, supra note 16, at 625. See
also Romano, supra note 90, at 151-52 "In any specific transaction, the
[financial] intermediary's incentive structure works against counseling a
downward revision, as intermediaries are paid more when their client
wins the auction." Romano further notes, however, that over the long
run, intermediaries who fail to warn clients about the winner's curse
eventually suffer reputational harm, assuming bad bidders attribute
their later failures to overbidding. "Over the long run we would expect
this effect to occur, and any problem of overbidding in the corporate
takeover market should be self-correcting." Id.
14 Evidence is mixed concerning whether bidders learn from past
mistakes. Roll is particularly negative on this point:
There is little reason to expect that a particular individual
bidder will refrain from bidding because he has learned
from his own past errors. Although some firms engage in
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Despite the persuasiveness of the winner's curse theory,
it is dependent on a world in which bidders are similar. In
the takeover world, however, bidders may well have unique
synergy potential with targets. Insofar as a bidder is unique
and offers particular synergy potential for a combination
with a target, it should not fall prey to the winner's curse.'47
Nevertheless, empirical evidence seems to suggest that, to
some extent, it exists.
Another explanation for acquisitions that falls under the
"wealth transfer" heading is the Jensen cash flow
hypothesis that was described earlier in this paper.
According to several articles, the Jensen hypothesis of free
cash flow/agency problems applies not only to targets, but
to bidders as well. In this light, acquisitions and mergers
are not only "solutions" to the free cash flow phenomenon,
but they are part of the problem as well. 149 The fact that
many acquisitions, the average individual bidder/manager
has the opportunity to make only a few takeover offers
during his career. He may convince himself that the
valuation is right and that the market does not reflect the
full economic value of the combined firm.
Roll, supra note 139, at 199-200. Black is about as negative on this
subject as Roll, and adds that it may take many years before a manager
learns for sure that he has overpaid for a target, giving him more time to
engage in further wasteful acquisitions. "[L]earning from past
overpayment is, at best, a weak cure for future overpayment." Black,
supra note 16, at 626.
147 "[A] bidder who has unique synergy with a target faces a winner's
curse only to the extent of the target's value to other bidders." Black,
supra note 16, at 625.
14 See Romano, supra note 90 at 151 (citing studies). At the same
time, Romano cites other studies suggesting that bidders do often adjust
their bids downward in response to the winner's curse. Id. at 150-151.
"9 See Mitchell & Lehn, supra note 16. Mitchell and Lehn found that
targets of takeovers were more-likely to have participated in valuereducing acquisitions than non-targets and that most of these "bad"
acquisitions were eventually divested through "bust-up" takeovers.
Mitchell and Lehn were looking at mergers and acquisitions that took
place in the 1980's. Today's mergers and acquisitions are similar in that
many current acquirers have free cash (or market-inflated stock) to
invest in targets. "As the economy purrs along, many companies have
surplus cash flow, but few promising places in which to invest it. To put
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today's acquirers experience positive returns prior to the
announcement of the acquisition supports this theory.50
Finally, another variant of the wealth-transfer argument
is the overpayment hypothesis, which has been most
thoroughly described by Professor Black."5 ' Black's
overpayment hypothesis is in part an extension of Jensen's
free cash flow hypothesis to bidders, with the further twist
that bidder share prices do not drop as much as they should
because the bidder shareholders already expect their
15 2
managers to misinvest excess cash in wasteful projects.
Black's theory is a combination of Kraakman's
misinvestment hypothesis and Jensen's free cash flow
theory. He assumes that some, but not all, bidders overpay
for targets.'53 The overpayment hypothesis is extremely
provocative because it suggests that "bad" (or wasteful)
managers can outbid their "good" counterparts. For
example, in an auction for a target, Bidder X, whose
shareholders already expect him to misinvest several billion
dollars can bid that amount, plus the expected value of any
synergies that might evolve from the deal. Bidder Y, on the
other hand, does not waste cash and his shareholders do
not hold any expectations that he will do so; therefore, Y
can bid only so much as synergy or other value-maximizing
gains will allow him to do so. Assuming X and Y are similar
companies and can expect the same synergies from the
target, X will win the auction." Clearly, this is not an
the capital to use, they are searching for appropriate takeover targets."
Gregory Zuckerman, One for the Books, Mergers and Acquisitions Report,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 15, 1996, at 14.
SO See Romano, supra note 90, at 150: "takeovers are both the
epitome of the agency problem and its solution."
161
Black,

supra note 16.

"In this paper, I advance the hypothesis . . . that, for many
takeovers, target shareholders gain partly because the bidder pays too
much. These overpayments don't cause bidder stock prices to drop
because investors already expect the bidder to waste the money, one way
or another." Id. at 599.
's Id. at 605.
Id. at 615-616. Applied to a series of acquisitions financed by cash,
152

Black writes:
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efficient allocation of resources if it exists. Like Lehn and
Mitchell, however, Black assumes that eventually bidder X
will use up his misinvestment allowance and that
eventually X will trade at such a point below its true asset
value that X eventually will become a target of a
takeover.'55
For Black's theory to be correct, two conditions must be
met: the bidder must "overpay" for the target, and the
investor must already expect the manager to misinvest
company funds. The first condition, that bidders overpay for
targets, is supported by economic and accounting literature
suggesting that most acquisitions lead to losses in
productivity of the combined entity.' The second condition,
that bidder shareholders already expect their managers to
misinvest, is harder to prove.
The overpayment hypothesis is different from the hubris
or free cash flow/agency hypotheses because it does not
purport to identify the motivation for managers who engage
in overbidding. Rather, it allows for one or a combination of
all theories. Hubris or "winner's curse" or even a
combination of either one with the synergy theory might
explain why the bidder decides to pay too much for the
target, but the overpayment theory explains why the stock
price does not significantly drop in contemplation of that
acquisition.
It is clear that the wealth-transfer theories demand a
closer look at the way the law treats bidder shareholders
following the announcement of potentially destructive

[t]here will be positive or negative incremental effects on
stock price from various combinations of (i) unexpectedly
profitable or unprofitable investments, which are (ii)
unexpectedly high or low risk (and thus have unexpectedly
high or low expected return), and are made by (iii) bidders
who were previously expected to make positive or negative
net present value investments.
Id. at 620.
' Id. at 622.
' Id. at 605-606 (citing studies).
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acquisitions. Before these theories (or any legal reform) can
be embraced, however, an analysis of the empirical evidence
measuring the wealth effects of acquisitions is warranted.
B. Empirical Evidence: How Mergers Affect Bidder
Shareholders
In evaluating returns to target and bidder shareholders,
five sets of findings and conclusions are possible. First, one
might find that takeovers increase both bidder and target
shareholder value. Were this the case, takeovers would be
prima facie socially beneficial and I would have nothing to
write about. A second possibility is that one might find that
takeovers produce gains for target shareholders, but
produce net zero returns for the bidder shareholders. In
this case, wealth maximization has taken place, but all of
the wealth has landed completely in the laps of the target
shareholders. A third possibility is that while targets have
registered gains, bidder shareholders have suffered losses
that are less than the target's gains, but significant
nonetheless. In such a case, a partial wealth transfer has
taken place between bidder and target shareholder. A
fourth possibility is that the target's gain is exactly
commensurate with the bidder's loss. Excluding takeover
costs, no net social gain or loss has occurred. Rather, the
takeover represents a full wealth transfer between bidder
and target. The fifth (and final) possibility is that the
target's gain has been outweighed by the bidder's loss. In
such a case, an aggregate loss in wealth has occurred.
All scholars agree that if takeovers produce overall
losses in wealth (possibility number five), takeovers should
be discouraged. Because of the costs of takeovers, most
scholars further agree that wealth transfers (possibility
number four) and partial wealth transfers (possibility
number three) should be discouraged.'57 Moreover, if the

7 Professor Coffee persuasively argues that wealth transfers should
be discouraged:
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reason behind the partial or full wealth transfer is that the
bidder managers acted because of hubris or ego at the
then those same
expense of their shareholders,
shareholders should have some claim against their
managers for having expropriated their wealth and
transferred it to an entirely different group of shareholders,
in violation of their fiduciary duties.
According to most financial and economic literature,
acquisitions generate wealth for target shareholders. 5 8 The
literature is less conclusive with regard to bidder
shareholders. Part of the conclusion comes from the
methodology used by those seeking to measure postacquisition return to bidder shareholders. Romano has
noted that gains to bidder shareholders are not easily
measured, since the bidder is normally larger than the
target, its bid may itself reveal information that skews the
stock price effect, and the acquirer's gain from the merger
may already have been anticipated in the stock price if it
had been engaged in a series of acquisitions.'59
Public policy should seek to discourage mere wealth
transfers between bidder and target shareholders (in either
direction), both because there are no redistributive goals to
be served in this context and because wealth-transferring
takeovers are likely to involve an element of coercion, which
means that these transfers are not voluntary in the usual
sense of the term. Indeed, even where the winner's gains
clearly exceed the loser's losses it does not follow that society
is entitled on efficiency grounds to disregard the fact that
uncompensated losses to some group are foreseeable.
Coffee, supra note 13, at 1173-74 (emphasis added).
"' Romano, supra note 90, at 122. "All studies find that target firms
experience statistically significant positive stock price responses to the
announcement of takeover attempts or merger agreements." Id.
'59
"There are, however, theoretically plausible reasons for not finding
positive abnormal returns to bidders even when acquisitions are valuemaximizing transactions. First, acquiring firms are typically much larger
than target firms, making it more difficult to measure abnormal returns.
Second, a bid may reveal information about the bidding firm unrelated to
the particular acquisition confounding the stock price effect. Third, if the
takeover market is competitive then bidders will earn only normal
returns, as abnormal profits are competed away." Id. at 123-124.
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Generally, two types of studies exist. "Event studies,"
which are the most common in the finance literature,
measure the acquisition's effect on shareholder wealth by
looking at the acquirer's stock price in the months
preceding and following the announcement and completion
of the transaction in question. The "window" or amount of
time before and after the merger announcement used for
computing bidder shareholder returns has a great effect on
the results. Professor Black summarizes that, depending on
the window period used, most older studies show, "that
since 1975, takeover bidders have earned at best a zero, and
16
perhaps a slightly negative, net-of-market return.""
If
bidders are earning a zero or non-negative return and
targets are earning positive returns, some scholars argue,
then takeovers create a net social gain in society and should
be encouraged. 6 Black's overbidding hypothesis, however,
undermines this conclusion by suggesting that stock price
declines are muted by investor expectations that their
managers will misinvest excess cash. Moreover, other

"oBlack, supra note 16, at 602. See also Roll, supra note 139, at 204206 (citing studies): In 1983, Malatesta found that although mergers
were positive events for target shareholders, their impact was "larger in
absolute value and negative for acquiring firms." Peter H. Malatesta, The
Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of Merging
Firms, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 155 (1983). Varaiya found that the larger the
premium paid to the target, the greater the acquirer's loss. Nikhil
Varaiya, "A Test of Roll's Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,"
Working Paper, Southern Methodist University School of Business, cited
in Roll, supra note 139. But see Jensen and Ruback, The Market for
Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (arguing that acquiring firm
shareholders actually register gains).
.1Those who make this argument usually explain away the bidder
shareholder's net zero return as a result of competition between bidders
for syn6rgistic and efficiency gains. See, e.g., Sidak & Woodward, supra
note 112, at 796-800. This explanation is limited by the fact that bidders
are not "fungible" and thus should not be competing away potential
synergies that no other bidder can match. See Black, supra note 16, at
603.
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studies from the time period suggest that the bidder's losses
are, in fact, significant.'6 2
Other types of studies measure the productivity of the
combined firm following the acquisition. Since these studies
do not rely on stock market returns, they offer more
concrete evidence about the accuracy of Black's
overpayment hypothesis. The most famous of these studies
was written by Caves, who concluded that mergers and
acquisitions did not produce the expected gains following
completion of the transaction." Caves' study was followed
by several others that backed up his conclusion. A few
studies reported opposite effects, but most did not deal
directly with acquisitions by public companies.' Whatever
the case, most scholars conclude that the effect on postmerger productivity is, at best, inconclusive.
Some might argue that because the studies quoted above
examine the wealth effects of what were mostly
conglomerate mergers or bust-up takeovers, they are not
applicable to the current merger wave. Newer studies of
acquirers' post-merger stock performance, however,
162 See

Ellen Magenheim & Dennis Mueller, Are Acquiring-Firm

Shareholders Better Off After an Acquisition? in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS &

0

TARGETS, supranote 15, at 171.
.. Citing various studies examining post-merger profitability,
productivity and market share, Caves concludes, "[elx post, recent
studies [indicate] that mergers not merely fail to warrant acquisition
premia, but actually reduce the real profitability of acquired business
units, increase the intraindustry dispersion of plants' productivity levels,
and shrivel the acquiree's market share." Richard E. Caves, Mergers,
Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency, 7 INT'L J. IND. ORG. 151, 167 (1989).
Caves supports Jensen's free cash flow theory of acquisition motivation
on the part of the bidders. Id. at 169. See also Edward S. Herman &
Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS, supra note 15, at 211.
"' Studies cited in Sidak & Woodward, supra note 112, at 799 n.52
measure the effects of management buyouts and leveraged buy-outs on
the firm's operating performance. Since MBOs and LBOs are fueled by
debt, however, they are different from acquisitions by public companies
since creditors may be able to exercise greater control over managers ex
post. In addition, Romano cites two unpublished studies arguing that
corporate performance does in fact improve post-merger. See Romano,
supra note 90, at 125 n.17.
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strongly suggest that overpayment or other hypotheses
falling within the wealth-transfer category may be
accurate. Recently, Business Week reported the results of a
study it conducted with Mercer Consulting of 150 deals
valued at 500 million dollars or more and completed
between 1990 and July 31, 1995. Of the deals analyzed,
50% of them resulted in shareholder losses to the acquiring
corporation, judged in relation to Standard & Poor's
industrial indexes.16 Moreover, the Business Week study
found that nonacquirers were more likely to outperform
their peers than those firms that engaged in substantial
166
amounts of acquisition activity.
C. Conclusion
The latest empirical evidence on mergers and
acquisitions suggests that bidders lose, and that they lose
because of some combination of the wealth-transfer theories
stated above. The overpayment, hubris, free cash flow
hypotheses best explain why combined entities, as a whole,
fail to lead to increased productivity and why bidder
shareholder returns are, depending on the window period
used, negative. Even in a purely competitive world, bidder
shareholder returns should never fall below zero.'67 The
synergy and managerial discipline theories simply do not
provide explanations for negative bidder shareholder
returns; the wealth-transfer theories must therefore have
16sThe

Case Against Mergers, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 1995, at 123. 30% of

the deals "substantially eroded" shareholder returns, while 20% simply
"eroded some" shareholder returns. Business Week's "window" extended
from three months before and up to three years after the announcement
of the deal. Again, since the negative returns to bidders are not compared
with the positive gains enjoyed by target shareholders in the same
period, it is difficult to determine whether this period of merger and
acquisition activity was socially inefficient.
16 Between January 1, 1990 and July 31, 1995, 69% of nonacquiring
companies (companies making no acquisitions larger than 5 million
dollars) outperformed their Standard & Poor's industry indexes. 58% of
acquirers outperformed their respective Standard & Poor's indexes.
167 "Competition can drive stock price returns to zero, but not beyond."
Black, supra note 16, at 604.
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some bite, given the statistical data and anecdotal evidence
of mergers and acquisitions gone awry.'68 Legal policymakers therefore should re-evaluate a system that allows
management to claim "synergy" so easily when it makes
potentially devastating acquisitions.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FOR BIDDER
SHAREHOLDERS?
The previous sections of this paper analyzed the ways in
which bidder shareholders are treated differently from
target shareholders by legal mechanisms. In terms of voting
rights, judicial review, state and federal legislation and
receive
bidder
shareholders
remedies,
appraisal
substantially less legal protection than their target
counterparts. Obviously, there is nothing wrong with such
asymmetrical treatment if bidder shareholders generally
benefit from mergers and acquisitions. Unfortunately, most
accounting and finance studies suggest that this is not the
case. If bidder shareholders are registering significant
losses, then part of the gain accruing to target shareholders
may represent a wealth transfer, involuntarily exchanged
by the bidder's management either for a larger empire or
simply as a way of investing excess cash. For years, legal
mechanisms regulating mergers and takeovers have been
target
with
vigorously debated
and
constructed
shareholders in mind. Now, we might re-evaluate the ways
in which the law treats their apparently poorer
counterparts, the bidder shareholders.
In the following section, I will first consider - and reject
the argument that no legal reform is desirable or
'68A possible argument to this may be that merger losses are not
caused by mis-valuation or overpayment of the target, but rather by a
failure to adequately integrate the two companies and their cultures
following the completion of the deal. Nevertheless, the costs of carrying
out the deal should be considered by the managers and integrated into
the premium before the manager undertakes the acquisition. Therefore,
post-merger explanations of negative bidder returns are reconcilable
with wealth-transfer theories such as hubris and overpayment.
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necessary. In addition, I will argue that legal reform and
increased protection of bidder shareholders can be achieved
without necessarily repealing key target protections, such
as the Williams Act or state anti-takeover legislation. Then,
I shall set forth several potential areas of reform, including
expanded voting rights, judicial review, and auction reform.
I do not claim to know which is the mechanism most
likely to protect bidder shareholders without unnecessarily
precluding "good" acquisitions, and thus an efficient
allocation of resources. Nevertheless, I do think any optimal
system of bidder shareholder protection will contain some
combination of all of these mechanisms. At the very least,
the suggestions contained herein should provide fodder for
further inquiry.
A. The Argument Against Doing Nothing
Even if one accepts the argument that acquisitions
ordinarily harm bidder shareholders, one still can argue
that no regulation is necessary since "bad" bidders
eventually become targets themselves and an efficient
allocation of resources eventually occurs.'69 In the interim,
however, bidder shareholders must suffer the losses caused
by inefficient managers. If the bidder shareholders' losses
(plus transaction costs) outweigh the target's gains, then
society suffers under this delayed action regime as well,
since the CEO may make several "bad" buys before
someone finally takes over the company. In addition, our
current legal system protects target managements from
hostile bidders. Thus, managers can easily make bad bids
and then entrench themselves in office with various
defenses once they become targets. This is hardly an
efficient system.
A stronger argument against bidder shareholder
protections is made by those who support the contractarian
theory of corporate law. 170 The empirical data reviewed in
"' See Mitchell & Lehn, supranote 16.
170 The

contractual theory of corporate law views corporate charters

as standard term contracts that best approximate the terms that would
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Part IV confirms the notion that bidder shareholders lose; it
does not, however, prove that these losses outweigh target
gains. Thus, we might say that the acquisition increases
social welfare overall, yet harms bidder shareholders more
often than not. Where only a partial wealth transfer has
occurred, such that the target's gains outweigh the bidder's
losses plus transaction costs, some have argued against
legal protection for bidder shareholders since the bidder
shareholder can easily protect himself by diversifying his
investments.' Under the contract theory of the corporation,
moreover, one might argue that the bidder shareholder
contractually "agrees" to a system that allows the
corporation's managers wide discretion in making
acquisitions and rationally integrates this knowledge into
the price of the stock."
Since the (well-informed)
shareholder may have some idea whether he will be a
target or a bidder in the future, he is in a sense betting on a
particular outcome and can improve that outcome by
holding a portfolio of diversified stocks.
The contractarian/diversification argument is supported,
in part, by Kraakman's misinvestment hypothesis and by
Black's use of Jensen's free cash flow theory: if the
have been negotiated between shareholder and management if
contracting costs were lower. In this sense, state corporation laws reduce
transaction costs of contracting between shareholder and management
and thus make stock cheaper. In addition, background terms reduce
agency costs between the shareholder and manager. See Daines &
Hanson, supra note 97, at 581-82, n.20. For a general debate of the
contractarian theory of corporate law, see Symposium, Contractual
Freedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
171 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 711-14 (1982). Easterbrook and Fischel
assume that the corporation is equally likely to be a target or bidder.
Bebchuk disputes this assumption. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820 (1989). Mitchell and
Lehn's work appears to undermine Easterbrook and Fischel's contention
as well. See Mitchell & Lehn, supranote 16.
72According to this view of corporate law, management's transfer of
wealth from the bidder to the target shareholder is "voluntary". But see
Coffee, supra note 13, at 1173-74.
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shareholder already expects his manager to make a "bad"
investment (and discounts the price of the stock
accordingly), why should the law treat the manager's
investment in a wasteful acquisition any differently from an
investment in wasteful research and development or other
types of negative present value projects?
Despite its internal coherence, the contract theory is
flawed in several ways. First, it is questionable whether
shareholders truly "agree" to give up wealth simply to
stroke the bidder management's ego when they initially buy
a share of stock. Corporate charters and state corporation
laws are not individually negotiated; they are (arguably)
adhesion contracts."' It is difficult, then, to attribute
"choice" to shareholders in a normative or descriptive
sense." Second, inefficient contractual agreements between
bidder shareholders and managers may affect third parties,
such as employees and bondholders. Third party
externalities therefore provide a second reason for
promulgating mandatory rules that prevent value-reducing
acquisitions." 5 Finally, even the contractarian must admit
'73Adhesion

contracts are agreements in which one party lacks the

ability to haggle over the individual terms of the contract. They are often
called "take it or leave it" contracts. According to the contractarian
theory of corporate law, shareholders "haggle" over the terms of the
corporate contract by choosing between competitive corporate charters
and state corporation laws. Corporate charters, however, often contain
inefficient terms and states continue to adopt inefficient anti-takeover
laws. These inefficiencies produce doubt as to whether shareholders have
power to dictate the terms of their contracts with corporate managers.
The "race for the bottom" mentality, whereby states compete for
corporate business by tailoring default rules to meet the needs of
managers, further undermines the contractarian's contention that
shareholders can protect themselves in a competitive contractual market.
"[S]tate antitakeover laws are strong evidence that the efficiency of
corporate law is, at best, limited." Daines & Hanson, supra note 97, at
588.
" Those who object to the contractarian view of corporate law often
speak in terms of the shareholders' imperfect information when they
"accept" a particular term in the charter. See Bebchuk, supra note 171, at
1825 (discussing difference between contracting for initial corporate
charter
and opting-out of mandatory rules "midstream").
'75 Cf Daines & Hanson, supranote 97, at 598.
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that corporate managers are bound by fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care regardless of whether the stock price
includes
shareholders'
expectations
about
future
managerial misconduct. It is currently standard corporate
fare to expect managers to obey fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care. Hubris and empire-building arguably qualify as
violations of the latter duty. Surely, legal mechanisms
protecting target shareholders rely on fiduciary duty and
protection against loss, and not contract theory.'76
"So," the contractarian might respond, "repeal the target
shareholder protections and then we will have equality."
Scholars have debated for years the efficiency and wealth
effects of legislation such as the Williams Act and state
anti-takeover legislation statutes. Although repeal of these
protections might make the takeover process more
conducive to bidders and thus reduce costs associated with
the takeover process itself, it would not prevent managers
from making wealth-reducing acquisitions based on inflated
egos or desires for empire-building. In addition, any
attempt to remove target protections would be met with
extreme opposition from incumbent target managers.
Something else is needed.
B. Five Potential Areas of Reform
Increased legal protection of bidder shareholders can be
accomplished through at least three areas of corporate law:
voting rights, judicial review, and auction reform. Voting
rights and auction reform are mechanisms that attempt to
prevent harm to bidder shareholders before the transaction
has been completed. Judicial review, on the other hand, can
provide for compensation of unhappy shareholders
"' In other words, since lawmakers and judges have completely
rejected Easterbrook and Fischel's arguments concerning how the law
should treat target shareholders (see, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The
ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981)), lawmakers should similarly reject their
view of how bidder shareholders should be treated, since bidder
shareholders arguably are in a worse position than their target
counterparts.
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following the merger by holding managers (board members
and officers) personally liable for shareholder losses. In
doing so, judicial review may inaugurate general deterrence
among officers and directors who change their behavior in
response to the threat of future litigation. Finally,
injunctive relief allows shareholders to prevent particular
transactions by bringing litigation before sympathetic
courts.
1. Expanded Voting Rights
The least radical of the three areas of reform is the
expansion of voting rights to bidder shareholders in all
takeover situations.1 77 Professor Coffee and several others
have argued that expanded voting rights can protect
shareholders
from managers
who make wasteful
acquisitions based on a desire to engage in empirebuilding."" Coffee would have shareholders vote on the
transaction after it had been announced, but before its
completion. That way, "bidder shareholders would be voting
on a transaction with the market's judgment largely in
front of them and would understand that a rejection would
restore the discount in share value which an adverse
market reaction had already subtracted from their
shares."'79 Unlike other shareholder voting mechanisms,
this one would not be burdened by the collective action
problem since bidder shareholders presumably would have
cheap and instantaneous access to information concerning
the value of the acquisition by noting the drop (or rise) in
stock price. Moreover, management would have to expend
costs to issue a proxy statement explaining the details and
specific terms of the offer. Thus, the costs of acquiring
information about the acquisition and of acting on that
information would be relatively low. According to Coffee,
'"This would entail the provision of voting rights for all acquisitions
of corporations, regardless of the form in which they are accomplished.
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
'78Coffee, supra note 13, at 1269 nn.378, 379 (citing authorities).
179

Id.
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shareholders presumably would vote against mergers
whose announcements have been greeted with decreases in
stock price. Finally, Coffee concludes, mandatory voting
rights would, at the very least, provide arbitrageurs and
institutional shareholders with a mechanism in which to
signal their displeasure with the proposed acquisition and
thereby derail its completion."8
Coffee's thesis suffers several flaws. First, even when
shareholders have cheap access to information, they still
may act against their best interest if they believe that their
vote will have very little impact on the overall outcome."'
Second, Coffee's voting mechanism depends heavily on the
market to portray correct information about the value of a
particular acquisition following announcement. If, as
Kraakman and Black have hypothesized, shareholders
already expect bidder managers to misinvest corporate
funds, the stock price may not decline following
announcement of the acquisition, or if it does, it will not
decline as much in value as it should, given the destructive

'8 Id. at 1269-70: "In such a context, the usual obstacles to
shareholder activism would be minimized, and indeed one could expect
arbitrageurs and institutional investors to seek to organize shareholder
resistance to a pending takeover that the market perceived as
unpromising for the bidder."
181See

Grundfest, supranote 18, at 857:

If individual shareholders rationally calculate that their
own participation in the decision process has only a small
likelihood of affecting corporate action - either because they
hold a very small percentage of the corporation's shares or
because they expect that collective action problems will
prevent an effective group response - then those
shareholders may rationally decide not to participate in the
process at all.
In addition, shareholders with heterogeneous interests may have a
difficult time coordinating their response to a proposed acquisition. This
might be the case if one group of shareholders disliked all aspects of a
proposed acquisition, whereas another group objected only to a limited
number of terms within the offer.
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potential effects of the proposed acquisition. Shareholders
therefore might not react by voting against the offer.'82
Finally, the question remains whether institutional
shareholders can (or wish to) influence the voting process as
much as they have influenced the hiring and firing of CEOs
in the corporate governance context. Institutional
shareholders are legally restricted from owning a
significant percent of stock in any one corporation. Their
power is grounded in the ability to send a symbolic message
to unopposed incumbent managers by withholding their
authority on proxy statements at annual shareholder
meetings." It is simply an open question whether a voting
strategy based largely on the power of a symbolic message
would be of any worth in the mergers and acquisitions
context.
One way to solve the shareholder collective action
problem would be to require a supermajority ratification of
all proposed acquisitions.' This requirement would give
institutional shareholders veto power over wasteful
acquisitions, reduce coordination costs, and overcome the
rational apathy phenomenon. At the same time, the
supermajority requirement might create new problems,
especially if targets used the voting mechanism as a "back
door" defense by buying up some stock and then voting
182

A possible response to this argument is that if shareholders know

that they have discounted the stock in expectation of managerial
misinvestment, the fact that the stock price remains constant will itself
be a source of information, and shareholders will rationally veto the
proposed transaction if the price fails to improve following
announcement of the transaction. On the other hand, the fact that the
price improves in this context does not necessarily mean that the
acquisition is value-producing, rather, it simply means that it is not as
bad as shareholders expected of the managers. In that case, shareholders
might ratify a value-reducing acquisition. Thus, the inability to separate
out the discount from the extra (good or bad) marginal effect of the
acquisition prevents shareholders from using the market to accurately
guide their voting decisions.
' See Grundfest, supranote 18, at 905 (explaining that the "just vote
no" mechanism is a "purely symbolic device that allows shareholders to
cast a vote of no confidence in management").
4 But see supra note 39 (discussion of Unitrin).
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against the transaction." Where targets had advance
warning prior to the announcement of a hostile bid, this
concern would be quite real and substantial.
Even if the collective action and market information
problems can be overcome, the voting rights mechanism
still presents further practical difficulties in its application.
Presumably, management would be expected to issue proxy
statements providing information about the terms of the
proposed acquisition. If shareholders rejected the
acquisition, that would be the end of the matter. If, on the
other hand, shareholders accepted the deal, further
complications would arise if another corporation offered the
target a higher bid. Should management be forced to reissue proxy statements every time it raises its bid? An
affirmative answer would entail a significant increase in
the cost of bidding and presumably a reduction in the
number of bids. To some extent, this is a good result; after
all, one way to prevent bad bids is to make the bidding
more expensive. Of course, the problem here is that all
bidders would be affected by the voting rights mechanism.
"Good" bidders might abandon bids because of the added
expense of administering a potentially complicated voting
process.86
The trick then is to provide voting rights protection to
bidder shareholders in an inexpensive fashion, especially
when other bidders present counteroffers to the target.
Coffee suggests that shareholders extend to managers the
authority to make counteroffers when registering their
initial vote on the specific terms of the acquisition. "If the
bidder were required to secure shareholder approval of a
proposed offer, and also permitted at the same time to
obtain ratification of a right to increase a bid in response to
any counter-bid made by a rival bidder, the necessity of
multiple resolicitation would fade."'8 7 Although the need for
..Coffee, supra note 13, at 1270.
" "By increasing the already considerable costs of consummating
acquisitions the requirement would tend to discourage acquisitions
generally, both profitable and unprofitable." Dent, supra note 11, at 788.
' Coffee, supra note 13, at 1270.
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"multiple resolicitation" might fade under this system, so
too would the protection against overpayment by bidders
taken in by the winner's curse during heated auctions. 88
Another solution is to allow shareholders to authorize the
offer and then set an agreed upon ceiling above which
bidder management would not be permitted to bid. Coffee
persuasively argues that this solution is also flawed
because it opens bidders up to the claim by targets that
they have not paid an adequate price for stock. The problem
of counteroffers simply defies an easy solution.
Finally, perhaps the most persuasive argument against
expanded voting rights protection is the prediction that its
adoption is not likely. Professor Dent argues that Coffee's
expanded voting rights proposal lacks political feasibility
and economic desirability. He questions whether states or
stock exchanges competing for corporate fees would act
against their own self-interest by placing constraints on
managers who wish to use the acquisition as a defensive
tool against future hostile tender offers.18 9
In sum, voting rights protection is not a panacea.
Nevertheless, some sort of voting mechanism might serve
as a useful tool for preventing particularly destructive
acquisitions. Moreover, it might allow shareholders of
target firms to prevent managers from derailing a
potentially lucrative takeover by defensively acquiring
other companies. The fact that some bidders already have
the right to vote under certain corporate charters or state
laws, moreover, proves that mechanical difficulties can be

"3 Dent concludes that the problems caused by repeated bidding and
resolicitation of proxies make expanded voting rights proposals
impracticable. Id. at 786-89.
18 Id. at 787. Dent also concludes that Congress is not likely to
legislate expanded voting protection because "Congress traditionally has
regulated only corporate disclosure and has left substantive corporate
regulation to the states." Id. In light of the "substantive" regulation
supplied by the Williams Act, Dent's observation appears to be weak
with regard to Congressional motivation.
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overcome without necessarily burdening the takeover
process.'
2. Expanded Judicial Review
Currently, target shareholders may seek relief under
Unocal when they feel that their managers are not
behaving in their best interests in defending the
corporation against a hostile takeover. As discussed in Part
III, Unocal provides intermediate scrutiny of managerial
action of target defenses adopted in response to takeover
bids. No such scrutiny applies to managerial action in
acquiring companies, despite many of the same concerns
that fueled the Unocal decision. Like the target managers
in Unocal, managers of acquiring firms often put their own
interests before that of their shareholders. It is not
unreasonable then, to request heightened review of
transactions likely to cause bidder shareholders negative
returns on the value of their stock. 1 '
Expanded judicial review is easier said than done. What
standard should courts apply to proposed and contested
transactions?"
Should courts abandon the business
judgment rule for an intermediate standard of scrutiny like
Unocal, or should they adopt a more detailed and searching
inquiry like the "entire fairness" test? Clearly, if courts are
to avoid the cost and inefficiency of examining each
transaction in its entirety while providing bidder
shareholders greater protection than the deferential
" I have found no research on the value of shareholder voting rights
to bidder shareholders when acquisitions are under consideration.
Nevertheless, Black agrees that Coffee's voting proposal is "worth
exploring" and further notes that the British currently use such a
system. Black, supra note 16, at 652. Clearly, further research
concerning the use and success of this rule in Great Britain is warranted.
9' Dent suggests the following rule: "[A] court should enjoin as
corporate waste or a breach of fiduciary duty any acquisition the
disclosure of which causes a material decline in the price of the proposed
buyer's common stock." Dent, supra note 11, at 794.
192 In using the word "contested", I refer to those transactions that
have already been completed and have caused shareholder losses.
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business judgment rule, they must create some form of
screening mechanism like Unocal's proportionality test.
What should this intermediate standard of scrutiny look
like in the context of bidder shareholders and when should
it apply? The mere fact that an acquisition threatens to
reduce the value of the bidder's stock, without more, does
not make the best case for increased judicial interference in
corporate affairs.193 This is especially so if bidder losses plus
transaction costs are outweighed by target gains. What
fuels Unocal review is the fear that the target managers
have been motivated by self interest and not shareholder
welfare. It is a weaker variant of the duty of loyalty
problems that accompany self-dealing and corporate
opportunity
doctrines.
Thus,
bidder
overpayment
hypotheses based on either hubris or empire building fit
squarely within Unocal's justification for heightened
review."M
Unlike other theories that attempt to explain
overbidding, the free cash flow theory may undermine the
argument for increased judicial review of acquisitions
because it applies to all transactions (for example,
investments in assets) financed with excess cash, as it is
premised on the basic agency problem between
shareholders and managers. Thus, if judicial review applies
to acquisitions, one might argue, it should apply to all
potentially destructive transactions financed with excess
cash flow. 95 Such a regime, however, would destroy the
193

See Dent, supra note 11, at 780 ("If unprofitable acquisitions

resulted from mere mistakes ofjudgment, perhaps the law could tolerate
them as it does other mistakes of business judgment.")
14 Included in this group are "defensive" acquisitions, wherein the
bidder management is in fact evading an offer from another company. In
this situation, Unocal should apply in full force, and it is unclear whether
it already does just that. Panter,which applied the business judgment
rule to defensive acquisitions, was decided prior to the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Unocal. Nevertheless, it was cited by the
Delaware Supreme Court with approval subsequent to its Unocal
decision in Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
...
If anything, one could argue that excess cash-fueled investments in
assets are more deserving ofjudicial review than overpayments for target
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business judgment rule and leave shareholders with a less
efficient system than the one they already have. Assuming
the business judgment rule is generally a legitimate and
useful doctrine, those who seek to protect bidder
shareholders must find some way of distinguishing
worthless acquisitions from other equally worthless

investments. Professors Dent and Black both respond that
acquisitions can be distinguished from other wealth
reducing transactions because they are "major events" and
more likely to be riddled by winner's curse or overbidding
problems.'9 6 Neither author offers much empirical evidence
to prove the salience of this distinction. One can easily
imagine that some investments in research and
development qualify as "major events" in the life of the
corporation as much as any acquisition. Moreover, winner's
curse problems may easily apply in situations where
auctions occur for acquisitions of oil fields or factory lots, as
opposed to auctions for other companies.
Without proof of even a weak variant of managerial
breach of loyalty, it simply is difficult to justify expanded
judicial review without gutting the business judgment rule
corporations since the first type of agency problem involves a complete
destruction of wealth whereas the second ordinarily involves a full or
partial transfer of wealth to target shareholders. "Overpayment in a
takeover differs in a critical respect from overinvestment in real assets.
Externalities aside, overinvestment in real assets involves net social loss
because better alternative investments are forgone. In contrast,
transaction costs aside, overpayment in a takeovers is merely a wealth
transfer from the bidder's shareholders to the target's shareholders."
Black, supra note 16, at 647.
' According to Dent, "[a]cquisitions are unusual, major events that
often dramatically affect stock prices. Most other corporate activities do
not influence stock prices to such an extent . . . . Acquisitions also
deserve special treatment because they generate losses more often than
other activities." Dent, supra note 11, at 805. Black distinguishes
mergers from other value-reducing investments by focusing on the
process in which they are completed, noting that winner's curse problems
more likely affect takeovers as compared with other investments. Black,
supra note 16, at 647. My argument is different from those put forth by
Dent and Black in that it focuses on violations of fiduciary duty and not
merely on the nature of acquisitions or the losses they cause.
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entirely." Fiduciary duties are normative rules that
guarantee loyalty and care (and good faith), not shareholder
maximization of wealth. Plaintiff shareholders therefore
should have to plead a prima facie case of managerial selfinterest in order to get courts to review the terms of the
transaction." 8 Thus, my suggested intermediate standard of
scrutiny would require the plaintiffs to plead a prima facie
case that managerial self-interest was a primary motivation
behind the proposed or completed merger or acquisition,
which was in conflict with management's loyalty to
shareholders.'
If the plaintiff cleared this hurdle,
managers would be expected to respond with evidence that
the acquisition would in fact produce the synergistic or
efficiency gains promised in press releases. If managers
failed to fulfill this burden, courts could enjoin the proposed
acquisition if not yet completed, or they could compensate
shareholders ex ante if the transaction had been completed
and shareholders could show loss resulting from the
acquisition.
Administering this form of judicial review admittedly
would not be very easy. First, discounts and other market
inefficiencies may make it difficult for shareholders to show
past or potential loss when challenging acquisitions. In
addition, almost all bidder managers would be able to point
to some potential synergy between target and acquirer that
197

Black argues the same point, concluding, "I would not change

judges' reluctance, embodied in the business judgment rule, to secondguess takeover bids and other investment decisions. The costs of
litigation are too high, and the business acumen of judges too meager, to
make it likely that the benefits of greater judicial scrutiny will outweigh
the costs." Black, supranote 16, at 651.
19 This seems to me to be more of a problem in theory rather'than in
practice. Plaintiffs simply would plead hubris, empire-building, or
defense from being acquired by another firm as a motive for the
acquisition when challenging bids that are too high because of the
winner's curse or too wasteful because of the extra cash in management's

hands.
19 I would define "self-interest" as any managerial motivation that
seeks to maintain, expand or increase the managers' wealth, prestige, or
position, at the expense of corporate profitability or shareholder welfare.
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they believed would materialize in the future. How then,
would judges be able to tell the difference between "good"
bidders and "bad" bidders? Indeed, on the target side,
judges have not been terribly keen in choosing between
loyal and disloyal target managers." One might wonder
then, why judges would do such a better job ferreting out
"good" from "bad" bidder managements. In sum, would
judicial error be so great as to make judicial review's costs
outweigh its benefits?
Professor Dent tries to avoid the problems discussed
above by offering a different form of judicial review, in
which he limits all relief to ex ante injunctions. Labeling his
solution a market-based approach, Professor Dent argues
that courts should enjoin all transactions that cause
"material" declines in the price of the stock upon
announcement." 1 According to Dent, injunctions are less
problematic than other types of relief because they do not
involve complicated inquiries about damages.0 2
Despite this concededly simple solution, Dent's proposal
still has its flaws. Like Coffee's voting proposal, the market
based approach is problematic on several levels. First, it
assumes that information about the wealth effects of the
proposed transaction is readily and immediately available.
Second, it assumes that the stock market perfectly reflects
this information and that judges will be able to distinguish
material declines from temporary noise in the stock
markets. 203 Third, it fails to take into account Kraakman
2"

"The tremendous deference that Delaware courts have given target

managements seems based not on confidence in the managements'
loyalty but on distrust in judges' ability to distinguish loyal from disloyal
managements." Daines & Hanson, supra note 97, at 604.
201"[A] court should enjoin as corporate waste or a breach of fiduciary
duty any acquisition the disclosure of which causes as material decline in
the price of the proposed buyer's common stock." Dent, supra note 11, at
794. Dent further specifies that plaintiffs would bear the burden of
proving a material decline in stock price. Id. at 795.
2Id.

at 796.

According to Dent, defendants would bear the burden of proving
that the decline was not caused by announcement of the imminent
merger. Id. at 795.
2"

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 1997

and Black's discount hypotheses. If shareholders already
expect their managers to make bad investments, the stock
price may not suffer a material decline. °4 Finally, it suffers
from a legal feedback problem: once stockholders knew that
they could get injunctive relief from courts, they would
incorporate this knowledge into the price of the stock, thus
failing to trigger the injunctive relief in the first place.
Dent recognizes the feedback problem, but discounts its
existence in practice. According to Dent, the market would
also incorporate the knowledge that a feedback reaction
would preclude judicial protection:
If the stock market were functioning perfectly it still
would react to the unwise merger. Recognizing that a
court would not enjoin the merger if the buyer's stock
price did not fall, owners of the stock would sell. If the
price fell to the point at which a court certainly would
enjoin the merger, investors would bid the price up.
Equilibrium would be the price at which the market
could not predict either a grant or a denial of an
injunction - that is, the borderline between a
material and an immaterial decline in price. If we
assume an unbiased market, approximately half of
these unwise mergers would be enjoined.05
Even if Dent. is correct (and one would need empirical
evidence to test both his hypothesis and the general theory
of the legal feedback effect on stock price), only half of the
mergers that should be enjoined will be enjoined. This
hardly seems efficient, much less optimal.
A final form of judicial review might be connected with
the expanded voting rights protection described in the
preceding section. Under this third variant of protection,
shareholders would first vote for or against the transaction.
If they ratified the transaction, and the acquisition later
204

In fact, price might even experience a slight rise if the acquisition

is less wasteful than the level of wasteful expenditure already expected
by the shareholders and incorporated into the discounted price of the
stock. See discussion infra.
205 Dent, supra note 11, at 803.
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proved to be financially destructive, shareholders would
have the option of suing managers for putting out false or
misleading proxy statements when ratification was
solicited. Coffee sees this as a problem.2" I, however, think
it could provide a nice solution to some of the problems
detailed above. Managers would be penalized only when
they put out false or misleading information. The threat of
litigation would force them to minimize costs following the
acquisition and would likely dampen their hubris and
likelihood of falling prey to the winner's curse before they
initiated or completed the transaction. Thus, the voting
rights protection provided above would allow shareholders
to prevent uneconomic bidder acquisitions, and if they
ratified the acquisition, they would be able to seek
compensation if they could show falsity or misleading
behavior on the part of over-eager bidder managers and
economic loss caused by the acquisition.2 " Undoubtedly,
this system would not eliminate overbidding or ego-driven
acquisitions, but it certainly might reduce their number
and detrimental effects on bidder shareholders.
I have described in this section three ways in which
judicial, review could be expanded to protect bidder
shareholders. The first would be based on the plaintiff
shareholder's prima facie showing of managerial ego or
hubris driving the acquisition. The second, Dent's proposal,
is based on market decreases in share price following
announcement of the takeover. The last, based on false and
misleading proxy statements, works in conjunction with the
voting rights protections described above to allow for
compensation whenever management has misled or
falsified information pertaining to the terms of the
acquisition. Each of these mechanisms carries with it costs
26 See
2o7Of

Coffee, supra note 13, at 1270.
course, this is a bit question begging, since I have argued

consistently throughout this paper that 'loss" cannot always be
measured by the market's valuation of shareholder stock. I would
respond that shareholders should have the option of illustrating "loss"
through reduced productivity and market share in addition to depressed
stock price.

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 1997

and benefits. Similarly, each mechanism requires further
examination and refinement before it is employed by courts.
(Indeed, I have not even begun to ponder the possible effect
of frivolous suits on this discussion). Nevertheless, the
three versions of judicial review set forth above illustrate
that expanded protection of bidder shareholders by courts
certainly is a possibility.
3. Liability Rule Protection
For those who have little faith in judges and substantial
reservations about shareholder ability to overcome the
collective action problem in the voting rights context, it
might be useful to consider a "liability rule" regime similar
to that proposed by Professor Hanson and Robert Daines in
the target context. 2 8 Daines and Hanson consider the
potential losses to target shareholders caused by target
managers' adoption of defensive tactics. Because courts
often are unable to distinguish between fair and unfair
takeover bids ex ante, Daines and Hanson argue for
"liability rule" protection for target shareholders, whereby
"managers could resist a takeover . . . so long as
shareholders were compensated ex post for having to forego
a takeover premium."2 9 According to this liability rule,
target management may defend against a tender offer so
long as it bonds itself to pay target shareholders later what
they would have gained had they not been prevented from
tendering their shares. If management is correct in stating
that the true price of the stock is greater than that offered
by the bidder, it gets back its bond at some later date; if
2
not, management gives it up to shareholders..
" Daines and
"8 Daines & Hanson, supra note 97, at 605.
20 Id. at 605.
210For the liability

rule to work, management must have access to the

funds needed to bond themselves to paying out what is owed to the
shareholders later. According to Daines and Hanson, a market for
bonding would emerge in which third parties would agree to bond loyal
managers and refuse to bond disloyal ones. Daines & Hanson, supra note
97, at 607. The third-party resistance bonder, presumably, would keep
management in line because his money was on the line. According to
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Hanson recognize that their liability rule is potentially
undermined by its dependency on market prices. If markets
are informationally, but not allocationally efficient,"' they
will reflect the shareholders' knowledge that they can get
their money back by way of a liability rule, thus creating
the so-called legal feedback loop discussed with regard to
Dent's proposal for injunctive relief.2 12 Thus, the market
price will not differ much (if at all) from the bid price.
Daines and Hanson attempt to solve this problem by
requiring resistance bonders to pay into an escrow account
until the stock price increases from its market position
following the takeover defense up until it reaches an
amount higher than the bid price. Once the stock price rises
above the bid price, the authors argue, the shareholders
and management will know the difference between the true
value of the stock at a given time in the future and the
bidder's premium that was foregone by shareholders.2 13
Daines and Hanson originally designed their liability
rule to apply to agency problems between target
managements and shareholders. 2 4 There is no reason,
however, that their analysis could not be expanded to
problems on the acquirer's side of mergers and
transactions. Thus, instead of "resistance bonding," we
would have acquisition bonding. According to Daines and
Hanson, the liability rule should guarantee that the
Hanson and Daines, the liability rule's third party bonding market,
"insures that the bonder's decision is in sync with shareholders' interest
by tying the bond to the share price and by requiring that the bond be as
substantial as shareholders' potential loss from unbonded resistance." Id.
at 628. In this sense, Hanson and Daine's reliance on market institutions
to monitor managers in the takeover context is very similar to Jensen's
argument that debt has a good monitoring effect on managers in the
context of leveraged buyouts. See Jensen, Agency Costs, supranote 15.
See discussion supraat note 90 and accompanying text.
...
212
Daines & Hanson, supranote 97, at 622.
213Hanson has referred to this mechanism in his classes as "topping
off."

state that, initially, the rule might be mandatory, but later
on would be voluntarily contracted for in the corporation's articles of
incorporation. See Daines & Hanson, supranote 97, at 623 n.216.
214They
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shareholder is no worse off than if the transaction never
took place. Therefore, stockholders should have at least as
much stock value after an acquisition than before it took
place. As applied to the bidder context, the Daines and
Hanson liability rule might require215 the bidder's
management to pay into an escrow account following the
acquisition an amount of money up to the point necessary to
make the stock move above the price it was trading at prior
to announcement of the merger or acquisition. 216 That way,

shareholders are assured that they will be no worse off than
before the announcement of the acquisition.
Although the Daines and Hanson liability rule
mitigates problems caused by the legal feedback loop, it
does not do the same for problems caused by the market
discounts identified by Kraakman and Black. The legal
feedback loop causes the stock price to be inflated over its
"true" price because of investor expectations. The
misinvestment discount, on the other hand, causes the
stock price to deflate below its "true"price.
Although it is possible to remove the legal feedback loop
by requiring managers to put money into an escrow account
until the price of the stock moves above the market price,
no such liability rule will remove the discount effect.
Imagine at T,, prior to announcement of an acquisition,
Bidder's stock is trading at D, the discounted market price
of the stock. At T2, Bidder's management announces an
acquisition. Four scenarios may result. First, if the
acquisition is truly an example of wealth creation, the stock
price will rise above its "true" price. Second, if the
acquisition is as wasteful as what shareholders already
expected of Bidder's management, the stock price will stay
constant. Third, if the acquisition is worse than investors
215This

rule could be made mandatory through state corporation laws
and/or stock exchange rules. It may not be as politically infeasible as the
reforms suggested above because it doesn't facially prevent any
particular acquisition.
216 There are, however, some problems that
would need to be worked
out because of the nature of the acquisition itself, which might result in
the creation of more stock shares.
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already expected, the market price will move downward to
reflect this information. Finally, if the acquisition is
wasteful, but not as wasteful as shareholders expected of
Bidder's managers, the stock price will rise, but not above
its true price. Thus, a wasteful acquisition could trigger an
increase in stock prices, as well as a decrease, or result in
the prices remaining the same. Because of the discount
effect, the liability rule, as defined by Daines and Hanson,
is therefore unable to properly distinguish between "good"
and "bad" acquisitions.
It is important to note that unlike the judicial
intervention advocated by Dent and discussed in the last
section, the liability rule advocated by Daines and Hanson
expressly eschews legal intervention in the takeover
process. I criticized Dent's market based proposal because
the "trigger," a decline in stock market prices, would be
hidden by the legal feedback loop. Daines and Hanson's
liability rule solves that problem - so well in fact, that it
obviates the need for judicial intervention in the first place.
Unfortunately, the discount effect identified by Kraakman
and Black undermine even this type of protection for bidder
shareholders. Nevertheless, its application in the
bidder/acquisition context should be seriously considered in
the future, since it would, at the very least, ensure
shareholder protection where announced acquisitions
exceeded
shareholder
expectations
of
managerial
misinvestment.
4. Auction Reform
Another source of protection for bidder shareholders is
auction reform. In the past, vigorous debate about the
wealth effects of auctions focused almost exclusively on
target shareholder welfare. Auctions, however, affect
bidders - and their shareholders - significantly. As was
discussed in Part IV, one of the reasons bidders overpay is
that they fall prey to the "winner's curse," whereby they
overbid for the target because of the nature of the auction
process. If that is the case, the auction process might be
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altered in such a way to prevent bidder overpayment
without creating target shareholder underpayment. One
possible way of combating the winner's curse is to limit the
number of auction participants, since bidders often fail to
properly adjust bids downward as the number of auction
participants increases. The problem with this suggestion,
however, is that it treats all bidders as fungible, and fails to
recognize that each bidder may have unique synergies with
the target. If that is the case, then a rule limiting the
number of auction participants will lead to an inefficient
allocation of resources, since the bidder with the greatest
synergies with the target may be left out of the takeover
process.
A less drastic way of mitigating the winner's curse may
be achieved by altering the financial advisers' incentive
structure. If investment bankers' fees were tied to
shareholder welfare and not the completion of a particular
deal, they might have more encouragement to warn bidder
managements about the winner's curse. In addition,
auctions might be altered by eliminating sealed bids.
According to Romano, the winner's curse is, in part caused
by uncertainty about the value of the target."" If sealed bids
are eliminated, would-be acquirers will not overestimate
the amount necessary to "beat" their opponents. 18 The
targets' assets would still go to the highest valuing bidder.
Targets, however, would undoubtedly complain that the
new system would deny them full realization of the value of
their stock. Policymakers could respond, however, that the
extra amount bidders add to bids to "beat" their opponents
has little to do with the value of the target and much more
to do with the problem of overbidding.

217"When

the value to the bidders of the auctioned item is uncertain,

the person who has overestimated the value the most will be the winner."
Romano, supra note 90, at 150-51.
218 For an interesting account of how sealed bidding affected opponent
bidders and their decisions on what to bid for a "target", see BURROUGH &
HELYAR, supra note 63, at 450-54.
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5. Encourage Management to Return Cash to
Shareholders
One of the explanations for bidder overpayment
discussed in Part IV was Michael Jensen's free cash flow
theory applied to bidders: managers with excess cash go on
spending sprees that include value-reducing acquisitions of
other companies. If acquisitions and bidder overpayment
are part of a larger problem of controlling agency costs
between shareholder and managers, one way to prevent
them is to encourage (or force) managers to remit excess
cash back to the shareholders. Caves supports such a
reform, concluding "[i]f a useful solution lies in the realm of
public policy, it probably involves increasing the incentives
for managers to return to shareholders cash that could
otherwise be used for low-value investments - whether
2 9 Caves does not go on define the
mergers or other outlays.""
specifics of such an incentive. In his original statement of
the free cash flow theory, Jensen argued that replacement
of cash with debt would produce the desired reduction of
agency costs between managers and shareholders' 0 Of
course, this could be achieved only by eliminating the public
shareholder altogether and replacing22him with bondholders
and banks via the leveraged buy-out. '

Professor Black suggests altering the present corporate
tax to "reduce managers' incentives to hoard, and sooner or
later to spend, excess cash."22 According to Black, removing
the taxation on corporate profits at the point of distribution
(or providing it with an offsetting deduction) would
encourage managers to return cash to shareholders, as
would a tax on shareholders on undistributed corporate

219

Caves, supranote 163, at 171-72.

22

Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 15.
Similarly, Black concludes, "[F]rom the perspective

of the

Overpayment Hypothesis, raiders may be among the best bidders,
despite their unsavory reputation in Congress." Black, supra note 16, at

650.
22Id.

at 651.
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profits.2" Clearly, the benefits of these reforms would have
to be measured against the federal government's
corresponding loss in revenue.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have tried to show in this paper that the law treats
bidder shareholders differently from the way it treats target
shareholders. While target shareholders enjoy the
protections of voting rights, Unocal review, protective state
and federal legislation, and even appraisal rights, bidder
shareholders retain only the limited protection provided by
the business judgment rule. It is clear that the law treats
bidder and target shareholders asymmetrically.
Unfortunately, it is even more clear that such
asymmetrical treatment is unwarranted. The fact that
bidder shareholders often earn a negative return proves
that the wealth-reducing theories (free cash flow, winner's
curse, hubris, etc.) are accurate at least in part. Losses to
bidder shareholders may outweigh gains to target
shareholders. Even if they do not, at least a portion of the
premium to target shareholders represents a wealth
transfer. These wealth transfers are involuntary and
represent violations of management's fiduciary duty to
shareholders. They are a form of agency costs and therefore
should be discouraged. If voluntary contracting costs are too
high, then mandatory rules should be put in place to protect
shareholders.
Arguing for protection is one thing. Crafting legal rules
which achieve that level of protection without destroying
the takeover process is quite another. I have set forth
several possible areas of legal reform with the background
223

In this vein, see Zohar Goshen's suggestion for a mandatory rule

providing shareholders with the option of selecting their yearly dividend
(pro rata) in stock or cash at fixed rates. In conjunction with this
mandatory rule, Goshen would remove tax rules that encourage

managers to hoard corporate profits rather than distribute them to
shareholders. Zohar Goshen, ShareholderDividend Options, 104 YALE L.
J. 881 (1995).
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assumption that it is not likely that the Williams Act or
state anti-takeover legislation will be repealed. (Even if
these mechanisms were repealed, they would make bidding
less expensive; they would not prevent bidder managers
from making destructive acquisitions, especially friendly
ones). Some combination of the reforms discussed in the
preceding section offers the best possibility for future
protection of bidder shareholders, but each needs further
research, refinement and testing. Nevertheless, it is time to
start thinking seriously about the bidder shareholder.

